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JUST NEGOTIATION 
REBECCA HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF

 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that the procedural justice—that is, fairness of 
process—plays a critical and largely unexamined role in legal 
negotiation, encouraging the acceptance of and adherence to negotiated 
agreements. An economic focus has dominated prior work on legal 
negotiation and has largely touted the importance of negotiated outcome 
rather than process. This Article marshals theoretical support for the role 
that procedural justice may play in bilateral legal negotiation and 
supports the theoretical case with empirical data from social psychology. 
A robust empirical literature has established that procedural justice has a 
significant effect on individuals’ perceptions of their outcomes in third-
party decision-making systems, encouraging acceptance of and adherence 
to outcomes and fostering a perception that decision-making systems are 
legitimate. Recently, such empirical work has begun to consider the effects 
of procedural justice in a setting without a third-party decision maker. 
These newest empirical findings support an increased role for fairness of 
process in negotiation. The Article concludes by exploring the 
complexities of taking procedural justice effects in negotiation seriously in 
light of the fact that legal negotiation is conducted by agent (the attorney), 
rather than principal (the client).  
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INTRODUCTION 
Negotiation is in many ways the poor stepchild of our civil dispute 
resolution system. Litigation carries with it all the pomp and circumstance 
of an impressive courthouse, robed judges, and, most importantly, 
substantive and procedural due process.
1
 Arbitration, too, has procedural 
 
 
 1. Our civil legal system is designed to afford not solely substantively fair outcomes, but also a 
procedurally fair process for all those who choose to avail themselves of its decision-making authority. 
An exhaustive discussion of the relationship between substantive and procedural due process is beyond 
the scope of this project; however, as Tribe has noted, procedural due process relates not just to ―the 
much-acclaimed appearance of justice but, from a perspective that treats process as intrinsically 
significant, the very essence of justice.‖ LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 
(2d ed. 1988). 
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safeguards that will land the parties back in a courtroom if the process 
goes too far astray.
2
 Even mediators vouchsafe a fair and unbiased process 
for participants.
3
  
In contrast, negotiation is the back-room, realpolitik, down-and-dirty 
way that most cases get resolved. Although it has been well documented 
that most of the cases with a legal basis for resolution
4
 are resolved 
through negotiation,
5
 there are few rules for lawyers‘ conduct during the 
negotiation process. Procedural and substantive legal rules for disputants 
engaged in negotiation are few and far between.
6
 It is ―just negotiation‖—
merely a process where disputants work out a resolution in any way they 
both might choose—and the only way to evaluate how well a negotiation 
has succeeded is to consider the favorability, or perhaps the fairness, of the 
outcome that the negotiation has produced. 
 
 
 2. Because arbitration is a private, contractual mechanism, courts have been more lenient in 
what is required of an arbitration setting than a litigation setting. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (upholding the enforcement of a predispute agreement to arbitrate claims 
that arose in the course of employment and rejecting challenges to the adequacy of arbitration 
procedures). However, the Supreme Court demonstrated some willingness to police the procedural 
aspects of the arbitral process. Therefore, despite the basic premise that parties may agree to a variety 
of arbitration procedures, and despite judicial deference to private ordering of the arbitration process, 
the existence of judicial oversight does in practice ensure that some minimum level of due process is 
met. See, e.g., Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting rules for arbitration 
promulgated by employer as unfair). Perhaps in response to courts‘ insistence on minimum 
requirements of fairness in arbitration, the large institutional arbitration players, such as the American 
Arbitration Association, the National Academy of Arbitrators, and JAMS/ENDISPUTE, have 
promulgated due process requirements for the resolution of disputes. See, e.g., AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 
(2005); JAMS/ENDISPUTE, SIX PRINCIPLES OF NEUTRALITY AND FAIRNESS FOR EMPLOYMENT 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE (1995); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES ON 
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS UNDER EMPLOYER-PROMULGATED SYSTEMS (1997). 
 3. There is no uniform set of rules that govern all mediations. However, mediators are typically 
members of a professional organization or a particular trade or other association that promulgates rules 
for mediation, which share some basic features. In all mediations, the parties remain free to accept or 
reject any agreement produced through the mediation process, ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. 
SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 338 (2002), and the mediator 
must be a third-party neutral who may not violate the confidentiality of private caucuses with either 
party, see id. at 348. Typically, mediation rules also provide for parties to be allowed a significant 
opportunity for participation, id. at 339, and ask that all parties to the mediation treat one another with 
courtesy and respect. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 36 
(2001) (citing Florida rules for court-appointed mediators stating that the ―mediator shall promote 
mutual respect among the parties throughout the mediation process‖) [hereinafter Welsh, Thinning 
Vision]. Additionally, the Uniform Mediation Act sets forth a model for rules governing mediation. 
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT §§ 1–17 U.L.A. (2003).  
 4. By this, I mean to exclude disputes of which there is no legal basis for the resolution—such 
as a dispute over a personal or business decision.  
 5. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994).  
 6. See infra Part II.B.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Or is it? A body of research, particularly in social psychology, has 
shown how deeply individuals care about the fairness of the processes that 
produce decisions of importance to them, and has identified distinct 
factors that lead individuals reliably to assess processes as fair or unfair. 
Over three decades ago, Thibaut and Walker‘s groundbreaking work on 
the role of ―procedural justice‖7 showed that the fairness of a process, 
distinct from the fairness or the favorability of the outcome, is an 
important factor in how individuals make assessments about decisions that 
affect them. Over time, procedural justice research has shown that the 
fairness of process also has important implications for individuals‘ 
satisfaction with outcomes and for individuals‘ assessments about the 
legitimacy of decisions and institutions. 
Although procedural justice research has typically focused on the 
importance of fairness of process to participants who receive a decision 
from a third party on a matter that is meaningful to them, newer empirical 
research has suggested that procedural justice effects may also be present 
in bilateral negotiation. This research suggests factors that lead to 
assessments of fair treatment in negotiation and indicates that the fairness 
of the negotiation process may have significant effects on parties‘ 
acceptance of and adherence to their negotiated agreements. Thirty years 
ago, Mnookin and Kornhauser suggested that substantive legal rules and 
endowments played an important role in negotiation, so that people were 
―bargaining in the shadow of the law.‖8 But individuals understand the 
court system to include not just the substantive legal endowments that 
Mnookin and Kornhauser described, but also the procedural protections 
that ensure a fair process. In this Article, I suggest that individuals are 
bargaining in the shadow of this fair process—in the shadow, in essence, 
 
 
 7. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
(1975). I want, at the outset, to distinguish ―procedural justice‖ as it is used in psychology and the 
psychology and law context from the way that some legal academics use the term procedural justice to 
refer more broadly to the fairness of a dispute resolution system. ―Procedural justice‖ as a psychology 
term refers to a particular body of social science research about how individuals perceive the fairness 
of dispute resolution systems. Procedural justice has been used more generally by philosophers, 
political theorists, and law and economics scholars to describe the fairness of a legal system, but this 
usage is broader than the specific psychology usage. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural 
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004); see also Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The 
Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 488–89 (2003); 
Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (1997). The legal 
philosophy, economic, or political theory perspective on what leads to a fair process and on what the 
effects of such a fair process are is relevant to, but not the focus of, my inquiry in this Article.  
 8. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/2
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of due process—with the fairness of the process playing a critical role in 
individuals‘ experiences in legal dispute resolution negotiation.9  
Negotiation is not just a vast wilderness vaguely related to our legal 
system; it is inextricably tied to our dispute resolution apparatus at every 
stage and every level. Because legal negotiation and settlement of disputes 
form such a large proportion of the disposition of legal cases, the way that 
disputants view negotiation is meaningful to their perspective on the legal 
system as a whole. Psychology research has shown that assessments of 
procedural fairness are reliably related to perceptions of legitimacy.
10
 
Because most cases are resolved by negotiation, the procedural fairness of 
those negotiations may have a significant impact on citizens‘ perceptions 
of the legitimacy of the legal system, writ large. I posit here that ―just 
negotiation,‖ that is, negotiation that is conducted in a fair manner, has an 
important effect on how disputants perceive negotiated outcomes and thus 
our legal system more broadly. 
Considering procedural justice in the negotiation context raises several 
critical questions. The first two questions are interrelated. One, can 
―procedural justice,‖ or fairness of process, reasonably be said to exist at 
all in the context of a dynamic two-party process in which no one can set 
rules and no one can impose a decision on the participants? In a context 
where both parties have the potential to contribute equally to the 
negotiation process and both parties must agree to any negotiated 
outcome, there is an open question as to the relevance of the concept of 
procedural justice at all. What does fairness of process even mean in 
negotiation? When is behavior fair, and when is it not? Secondly, then, we 
must ask what factors reliably guide negotiators‘ subjective assessments of 
whether they have been treated fairly. 
Another distinct concern raised by considering the role of procedural 
justice in negotiation is that the participants in legal negotiation are 
typically lawyers, rather than clients. Yet procedural justice literature has 
 
 
 9. Although the arguments for the importance of procedural justice in legal negotiation may 
extend beyond the dispute resolution context into transactional negotiation as well, I will exclude 
discussion of transactional negotiation from this analysis for several reasons. First, transactional 
negotiation has quite different characteristics than dispute resolution negotiation. Among many 
differences, in transactional work, parties are typically favorably inclined toward each other, whereas 
in dispute resolution, parties have already had a breakdown in their relationship with one another. In 
transactional work, parties are likely to be positive in their desire to forge agreement, whereas in 
dispute resolution, parties may not be interested in agreement. In transactional work, there is no third-
party decision maker looming in the background, ready to offer a solution if negotiation fails; there is 
also no set of law available to provide a default private ordering. Second, there is not yet sufficient 
empirical data on transactional negotiation and procedural justice to warrant drawing any conclusions.  
 10. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 162 (1990). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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largely explored the effects of fair process on the principals who receive a 
decision on a matter of importance to them. In the negotiation context, 
those principals are clients, who are not often present during the actual 
negotiation process. The lawyer-client principal-agent relationship 
considerably complicates, beyond the bounds of existing procedural 
justice literature, an understanding of the role that procedural justice does, 
might, and should play in bilateral legal negotiation. Two immediate 
questions stem from the presence of the principal-agent relationship in this 
context: first, whether lawyers are likely to experience procedural justice 
in a negotiation process in the same way that a client would; and second, 
how potential differences in the experience of fairness of process between 
attorneys and clients may unfold with respect to the ethics of 
representation and zealous advocacy. 
In Part I of this Article, I provide background on psychological 
research on procedural justice. In Part II, I sketch the landscape of prior 
work on legal negotiation, highlighting the emphasis on outcomes and the 
absence of a focus on the fairness of process. I also provide a brief 
background on the handful of explicit rules that do exist for the regulation 
of the negotiation process, showing that negotiation‘s reputation for being 
a lawyer‘s ―Wild West‖ is supported by the very slender set of rules that 
governs participants. In Part III, I explore the intersection of procedural 
justice and negotiation more fully, first addressing theoretical concerns 
that the absence of a third-party authority in negotiation may make an 
exploration of procedural justice inapposite and then discussing the small 
but growing body of empirical research on the psychology of procedural 
justice in negotiation. In this section, I demonstrate that the connection 
between procedural justice and negotiation is both theoretically and 
empirically sound. In Part IV, I raise and explore specific concerns about 
the intersection between procedural justice and negotiation in light of the 
attorney-client relationship present in the legal negotiation setting.  
I. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
In 1975, Thibaut and Walker published their seminal book, Procedural 
Justice: A Psychological Analysis, in which they set forth the results of 
multiple studies showing that individuals were more satisfied with dispute 
resolution mechanisms when they perceived that the process of dispute 
resolution was fair, irrespective of the fairness of the outcome or the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/2
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favorability of the outcome.
11
 This was a remarkable finding, but one that 
may not have surprised the original crafters of our justice system, 
concerned as they were with designing a system that afforded due process 
to its participants.
12
 What Thibaut and Walker did that was so 
revolutionary was to test, quantify, and clarify the great civic intuition of 
our legal system: that fairness of process matters to people and drives their 
assessments of dispute resolution processes separate and apart from the 
impact of how substantively fair, just, or good an outcome may be.
13
 
Thibaut and Walker found that individuals preferred adversarial over 
inquisitorial legal systems
14
 and also preferred to retain a large share of 
control of the process even when another party had control over the 
ultimate decision.
15
 
In the thirty years since Thibaut and Walker began their empirical 
exploration of the effects of procedural justice,
16
 the field has grown 
substantially. Studies have explored the scope of procedural justice effects 
across different settings, demographic groups, and cultures;
17
 the 
underlying mechanisms that produce the effects;
18
 and the impact of these 
effects on the perceived legitimacy of authority structures.
19
 Throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, Tyler, Lind, and other psychologists created a 
terrifically robust body of research findings that supported the importance 
of procedural justice in people‘s assessments of decisions. Indeed, ―[f]ew 
 
 
 11. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 7, at 73–74. 
 12. Tribe has described the due process right to be heard as ―a valued human interaction in which 
the affected person experiences at least the satisfaction of participating in the decision that vitally 
concerns her,‖ and has concluded that this right, ―analytically distinct from the right to secure a 
different outcome,‖ conveys ―the elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is at least to 
be consulted about what is done with one.‖ Tribe further noted the words of Felix Frankfurter, who 
wrote that the ―validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by which it 
was reached.‖ TRIBE, supra note 1, at 666.  
 13. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 7, at 94.  
 14. Id. at 77. 
 15. Id. at 119–22.  
 16. As MacCoun has suggested, procedural fairness may well be a better name, and I follow his 
and others‘ lead in using the terms interchangeably. Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and 
Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 172 
(2005); see also Kees Van den Bos & E. Allan Lind, Uncertainty Management by Means of Fairness 
Judgments, in 34 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 8 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2002). 
 17. See, e.g., Allan Lind, Yuen Huo & Tom Tyler, . . . And Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender, 
and Preferences for Dispute Resolution Procedures, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 286 (1994). 
 18. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value 
Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 830–31 (1989); Kees Van den Bos, E. Allen Lind, 
Riël Vermunt & Henk A. M. Wilke, How Do I Judge My Outcome When I Do Not Know the Outcome 
of Others? The Psychology of the Fair Process Effect, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1034, 
1035–36 (1997). 
 19. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 10, at 162. 
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if any socio-legal topics . . . have received as much attention using as 
many different research methods.‖20 Procedural justice affects judgments 
about satisfaction with interaction with the legal system in both civil
21
 and 
criminal settings.
22
 The effects in the civil setting are found in a variety of 
contexts, including judicial decision making,
23
 arbitration,
24
 and 
mediation,
25
 as well as in citizen encounters with the police.
26
 Procedural 
justice effects extend even beyond the scope of the legal system. 
Procedural justice effects are found in workplaces,
27
 organizations,
28
 
families,
29
 and social groups.
30
 Robust findings suggest that individuals 
value decision-making processes that they deem fair, are more willing to 
accept and adhere to decisions made via fair processes, and believe that 
authorities are more legitimate when they have used fair processes.
31
 
These findings support the hypothesis that individuals, while caring about 
 
 
 20. MacCoun, supra note 16, at 173. 
 21. E. Allan Lind, Robert J. MacCoun, Patricia A. Ebener, William L. F. Felstiner, Deborah R. 
Hensler, Judith Resnik & Tom R. Tyler, In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of 
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 953, 976 (1990). 
 22. Jonathan D. Casper, Tom Tyler & Bonnie Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 
LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 483, 483 (1988); Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ 
Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 333, 333 (1988).  
 23. TYLER, supra note 10, at 104–06. 
 24. E. Allan Lind, Carol T. Kulik, Maureen Ambrose & Maria V. de Vera Park, Individual and 
Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
224, 235–36 (1993).  
 25. Jennie J. Long, Compliance in Small Claims Court: Exploring the Factors Associated with 
Defendants’ Level of Compliance with Mediated and Adjudicated Outcomes, 21 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 
139, 140 (2003); Dean G. Pruitt, Robert S. Peirce, Neil B. McGillicuddy, Gary L. Welton & Lynn M. 
Castrianno, Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 327 (1993). 
 26. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping 
Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 513, 535–36 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. 
Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance 
of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253, 262 (2004). 
 27. Robert Folger & Mary A. Konovsky, Effects Of Procedural and Distributive Justice on 
Reactions to Pay Raise Decisions, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 115, 124–26 (1989); Tom R. Tyler, Promoting 
Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory 
Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1305–06 (2005).  
 28. Sheldon Alexander & Marian Ruderman, The Role of Procedural and Distributive Justice in 
Organizational Behavior, 1 SOC. JUST. RES. 177, 193 (1987). 
 29. Mark R. Fondacaro, Michael E. Dunkle, & Maithilee K. Pathak, Procedural Justice in 
Resolving Family Disputes: A Psychosocial Analysis of Individual and Family Functioning in Late 
Adolescence, 27 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 101, 114–15 (1998); Shelly Jackson & Mark Fondacaro, 
Procedural Justice in Resolving Family Conflict: Implications for Youth Violence Prevention, 21 LAW 
& POL‘Y 101, 118–19 (1999). 
 30. Heather J. Smith, Tom R. Tyler, Yuen J. Huo, Daniel J. Ortiz & E. Allan Lind, The Self-
Relevant Implications of the Group-Value Model: Group Membership, Self-Worth, and Treatment 
Quality, 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 470, 489 (1998). 
 31. TYLER, supra note 10, at 162.  
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how subjectively ―well‖ they do and how fair the outcome they have 
received is, also care, independently, about the fairness of process.  
Procedural justice theorists have not reached agreement on the 
motivations and mechanisms that drive people to care about procedural 
justice separate and apart from distributive justice (that is, the fairness of 
outcomes)
32
 and outcome favorability. Three theories attempt to account 
for procedural justice effects. First, Thibaut and Walker took an 
instrumentalist view, arguing that individuals preferred fairer processes 
because they were likely to produce fairer outcomes.
33
 Subsequently, Lind 
and Tyler proffered what they called the ―group value model,‖ suggesting 
that fairer processes were valued in and of themselves, unrelated to their 
effects on outcome, because they conveyed important messages to 
individuals about their status in society that in turn affected individuals‘ 
self-esteem.
34
 More recently, Van den Bos and Lind have suggested that 
―fairness heuristic theory‖ explains the effects of procedural justice: 
fairness judgments are important because they help to reduce uncertainty, 
and individuals rely on procedural justice cues to make assessments of 
satisfaction when there are no available cues about distributive justice or 
outcome favorability.
35
 
Although researchers disagree on why people care about procedural 
justice, they converge when assessing what factors individuals rely on 
 
 
 32. A long line of research in both psychology and, more lately, economics has established that 
individuals care about the fairness of the outcomes they receive. Research on relative deprivation 
suggested that individuals assess outcomes by comparing their own circumstances to the 
circumstances of others. See SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ET AL., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT 
DURING ARMY LIFE, VOL. 1 (1949); Robert K. Merton & Alice S. Kitt, Contributions to the Theory of 
Reference Group Behavior, in CONTINUITIES IN SOCIAL RESEARCH: STUDIES IN THE SCOPE AND 
METHOD OF ―THE AMERICAN SOLDIER‖ (Robert K. Merton & Paul F. Lazersfeld eds., 1950). 
Subsequently, equity theory suggested that individuals may assess outcomes using a metric of how 
proportional their reward is in relation to the effort they have expended. See ELAINE WALSTER, G. 
WILLIAM WALSTER & ELLEN BERSCHEID, EQUITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 11–12 (1978); Robert D. 
Pritchard, Marvin D. Dunnette & Dale O. Jorgenson, Effects of Perceptions of Equity and Inequity on 
Worker Performance and Satisfaction, 56 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 75 (1972). Other research indicated 
that sometimes individuals make decisions about outcome fairness based on how well the outcomes 
comport with other norms, such as equality or need. See Morton Deutsch, Equity, Equality, and Need: 
What Determines Which Value Will Be Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice?, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 
137 (1975); Melvin Lerner, The Justice Motive: Some Hypotheses as to Its Origins and Forms, 45 J. 
PERSONALITY 1 (1977); Thomas Schwinger, The Need Principle of Distributive Justice, in JUSTICE IN 
SOCIAL RELATIONS 211 (Hans Werner Bierhoff, Ronald L. Cohen & Jerald Greenberg eds., 1986). 
 33. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 7, at 121. 
 34. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A 
Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 830–31 (1989); see also 
TOM R. TYLER & E. ALLEN LIND, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 230–40 (1988)  
 35. Van den Bos et al., supra note 18, at 1035–36.  
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when making their subjective assessments of whether or not they have 
been treated fairly.
36
 A host of studies has focused on what individuals 
mean when they say that a process is fair or unfair. Beginning with 
Thibaut and Walker, researchers have distinguished between decision 
control, which is the extent to which individuals can shape the final 
outcome, and process control, which is the extent to which individuals can 
shape the way in which information relevant to the decision, such as 
evidence or arguments, is presented. The procedural justice literature has 
suggested that assessments about the fairness of a process stem largely 
from process control factors rather than control over the ultimate decision. 
Process control, over time, has become largely understood to be 
coextensive with the degree to which an individual has the opportunity to 
have a voice in a particular process in order to present his or her side of the 
dispute.
37
  
The procedural justice literature has also highlighted three other crucial 
components of a process that will help to determine whether it is judged to 
be fair. First, research in psychology demonstrated the importance of 
being treated with courtesy and respect; this dignitary treatment plays a 
large part in how individuals decide whether they have been treated 
fairly.
38
 Additionally, two linked factors—the trustworthiness of the 
decision maker and the decision maker‘s neutral, bias-free actions—have 
been found to relate strongly to individuals‘ assessments of process 
fairness in a third-party decision-making setting.
39
 Although other 
antecedents are sometimes discussed in the procedural justice research, 
recent literature has suggested that these factors—opportunity for voice, 
courteous and respectful treatment, trustworthiness of the decision maker, 
 
 
 36. It is important to keep in mind that this is a subjective judgment rather than an objective 
―reality.‖ See, e.g., Kees Van den Bos, On the Subjective Quality of Social Justice: The Role of Affect 
as Information in the Psychology of Justice Judgments, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 482, 483 
(2003).  
 37. See, e.g., Robert Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of “Voice” 
and Improvement on Experienced Inequity, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 108, 109 (1977). 
Research has suggested that the opportunity for participation may be important to individuals even 
when their participation is unlikely to affect the decision. This suggests that on some occasions, even 
nonmeaningful voice may lead individuals to assess a process as more fair. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind, 
Ruth Kafner & P. Christopher Early, Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and 
Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 957 
(1990); Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski & Nancy Spodick, Influence of Voice on Satisfaction With 
Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 80 
(1985). 
 38. Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Bies, Beyond Formal Procedures: The Interpersonal Context of 
Procedural Justice, in APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS 77 (John S. 
Carroll ed., 1990).  
 39. TYLER, supra note 10, at 117–18. 
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and neutrality of the decision maker—are the four dominant criteria used 
in making procedural justice assessments.
40
  
Decades of research in procedural justice have suggested that fair 
process is critical to the way that people respond to decisions and 
decision-making structures. Newer research has looked to explore the 
effects of procedural justice in settings where there is no third-party 
authority, such as bilateral negotiation. Before turning to a full exploration 
of that research in Part III, I briefly sketch the landscape of legal 
negotiation below. I explore both negotiation scholarship and legal rules 
for negotiation, showing that the field is largely dominated by a focus on 
outcomes, and on process only to the extent that it affects outcomes.  
II. THE LANDSCAPE OF LEGAL NEGOTIATION 
Academic and popular literature on negotiation has long suggested its 
potential to be an unbridled and combative process. Holmes Norton 
described negotiation as having ―all the adversarial potential of litigation 
and similar contests but few of the restraints.‖41 Norton explained the 
source of this behavior in negotiation as the need to increase one‘s 
economic outcome: ―the interest of a client, like the self-interest of 
ordinary negotiators, assures that the basic character of the relationship is 
always in some respect adversarial.‖42 Although she noted that adversarial 
processes are not inexorably bound to produce unfair behavior, she 
suggested that the adversarial character of the interaction ―may increase 
the pressure to behave‖ in unfair ways.43 Thus Holmes Norton elegantly 
summed up the link between a combative negotiation process and outcome 
in this way: people tend to choose a no-holds-barred negotiation process 
because they believe it is most likely to achieve the best outcome for their 
own side.  
In this section, I briefly explore both (1) existing negotiation research‘s 
common vision of negotiation as an adversarial and combative process, 
and (2) how negotiation literature largely treats process as a means of 
achieving particular substantive outcomes rather than as an important 
element of negotiation in its own right. I examine these concepts in three 
dominant visions of negotiation: first, the Mnookin and Kornhauser 
 
 
 40. Tom Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Justice and Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 295, 300 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004).  
 41. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethics of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 530 
(1989). 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 531. 
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―shadow of the law‖ concept; second, Fisher and Ury‘s principled 
negotiation and Menkel-Meadow‘s problem-solving negotiation 
paradigms; and finally, economic research on bargaining.  
I do not purport to present an exhaustive panoramic view of all 
negotiation scholarship; rather, I provide a series of snapshots of 
prominent work in negotiation that illustrate some common underlying 
assumptions about negotiation process and about the importance of 
outcome versus process. I also present, as a counterpoint, some of the 
growing voices in negotiation scholarship urging that fairness of process 
in negotiation be taken seriously. I then examine more closely the handful 
of rules that do exist for process in negotiation. I demonstrate that the rules 
do not circumscribe negotiation behavior very significantly, that the rules 
primarily focus on negotiation outcome rather than process, and that when 
the rules do focus on process, they do so only to the extent that process 
directly affects outcome.  
A. The Role of Process in Prior Negotiation Scholarship 
1. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law  
For thirty years, legal negotiation has been characterized as occurring 
in the shadow of the law.
44
 In 1979, Mnookin and Kornhauser wrote a 
seminal article about the way that legal entitlements might affect the 
negotiation process. They suggested, specifically, that considering 
endowments that the law gave to particular parties would shed light on 
how negotiations might be conducted, and parties might use these 
endowments strategically in negotiation to improve their outcomes.
45
 
Mnookin and Kornhauser explored the case of divorce law, and argued in 
favor of private ordering in that context. They supported the prerogative of 
parties to negotiate their own outcomes in the case of divorce, while 
maintaining a limited oversight role for the court, particularly in the 
context of child custody issues.
46
 
 
 
 44. Robert Mnookin and Louis Kornhauser first coined this term thirty years ago in their 
groundbreaking article, supra note 8. Since then, many other scholars have used the term and the 
framework to explore specific areas of the law in which legal endowments affect negotiation. See, e.g., 
Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in 
GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 158 (2000); Maureen A. O‘Rourke, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Copyright Law After Tasini, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 605 (2003); Guhan Subramanian, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621 (2003).  
 45. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 8, at 968–71.  
 46. Id. at 956–58. 
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Mnookin and Kornhauser drew a rich picture of the forces at play in 
the process of bargaining in divorce cases. They suggested that there were 
two primary sources of conflict in divorce negotiation: money and 
custodial matters.
47
 They then offered a complex picture of how the legal 
endowments in these areas might affect the parties‘ bargaining behavior.48 
For example, they considered how a change from a maternal-preference 
custody rule to a sex-neutral rule would affect negotiation, suggesting that 
such a change would increase fathers‘ bargaining power and decrease 
mothers‘ bargaining power. In turn, this might lower alimony or child 
support payments.
49
  
The Mnookin and Kornhauser paradigm of bargaining in the shadow of 
the law is powerful and compelling and offers useful insight into the 
process of negotiation. But in acknowledging the limitations of their 
framework, Mnookin and Kornhauser revealed their own lack of interest 
in the role played by process qua process, and highlighted the importance 
of outcome in their discussion. ―There now exists,‖ they lamented, ―no 
bargaining theory that can yield accurate predictions of the expected 
outcomes with different legal rules, even when rational, self-interested 
parties are only negotiating over money issues.‖50 The authors suggested 
that the study of process is important to help understand how certain 
outcomes, and not others, are reached, even if the picture that develops is 
incomplete.  
So Mnookin and Kornhauser shed terrific light on the process of 
bargaining in cases where legal entitlements exist, and they made a strong 
case for the effect of legal entitlements on how parties negotiate and on the 
ultimate negotiated outcomes. But they did not examine process for its 
own sake or consider the impact of different types of processes of 
negotiation on the parties. For example, does a negotiation in which the 
parties rely frequently on the background legal rule affect the parties 
differently than a negotiation in which the legal rule is not discussed? 
Might a party be more satisfied with an outcome that closely tracked the 
legal endowments, or might a party be more satisfied with an outcome if 
she has no knowledge of the legal endowments? Are parties more 
enthusiastic about outcomes when their negotiation process has focused 
extensively on legal entitlements, or do parties adhere more strongly to 
outcomes negotiated without reference to legal rules? Does the use of legal 
 
 
 47. Id. at 963.  
 48. Id. at 968–84. 
 49. Id. at 978. 
 50. Id. at 996. 
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entitlements during the negotiation process affect the perceived fairness of 
a negotiation? These are the kinds of questions that Mnookin and 
Kornhauser, and the many scholars that have followed them in considering 
the role of legal endowments in the negotiation process, have not 
considered.  
2. Principled and Problem-Solving Negotiation  
The popular bestseller Getting to YES,
51
 by Fisher and Ury, portrays the 
default style of negotiation, ―positional bargaining,‖ as an adversarial 
process that pits one party against another. The book begins, ―Whether a 
negotiation concerns a contract, a family quarrel, or a peace settlement 
among nations, people routinely engage in positional bargaining. Each 
side takes a position, argues for it, and makes concessions to reach a 
compromise.‖52 The authors argue that this positional bargaining can be 
hard or soft:
53
 the hard, no-holds-barred combative negotiation approach 
stems from a desire to maximize outcome, while the soft, accomodating 
style comes from a motivation to avoid disrupting parties‘ relationships.54 
However, the authors quickly dispose of the soft negotiator in the first few 
pages of their text, while the hard bargainer remains a concern throughout 
the book.
55
  
Against the foil of the competitive negotiator, Getting to YES offers its 
readers a different approach, called ―principled negotiation,‖ which 
focuses on parties‘ interests rather than positions and urges both sides to 
brainstorm creative solutions and generate multiple options to resolve their 
disputes.
56
 Throughout the book, the authors advocate disentanglement 
from interpersonal strife
57
 and the use of objective criteria to establish fair 
benchmarks.
58
 The authors consciously suggest that this is a new approach 
to negotiation,
59
 and that the behavior of many negotiators (at least, those 
 
 
 51. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (Bruce Patton ed., 1991). Getting to YES 
is widely believed to be the most popular book on negotiation in the United States, used in countless 
negotiation classes in law schools, business schools, and beyond. Almost 30 years after its publication, 
it is still a best seller. See The BusinessWeek Best Seller List: Long-Running Best Sellers, 
BUSINESSWEEK, July 23, 2009, http:// www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_31/b414106359 
1592_page_2.htm. 
 52. FISHER & URY, supra note 51, at 3.  
 53. Id. at 8–9.  
 54. Id. at 8.  
 55. See, e.g., id. at 92–94; 107–12; 118–28; 130–43. 
 56. Id. at 10–14.  
 57. Id. at 21–39.  
 58. Id. at 81–94. 
 59. Id. at 10. 
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who have not read the book) is likely to be positional, and, among those 
negotiators who want to achieve good outcomes, likely to be 
competitive.
60
  
The book offers both a vision of typical negotiation behavior and an 
explanation for what produces that behavior. Typical negotiation behavior 
has a hardball, ―anything goes‖ quality; this is because individuals are 
motivated by their desire to maximize their gain in negotiation and 
competitive, no-holds-barred behavior is the way to do so. The authors 
provide an alternative process for negotiating—one that certainly seems 
more fair and reasonable to many people.
61
 Fisher and Ury encourage 
respectful behavior between parties, the use of objective criteria, an 
emphasis on both parties having their needs met, and ethical treatment of 
the other party to the negotiation. However, the end goal remains, largely, 
to encourage favorable outcomes—indeed, better outcomes than one might 
receive through positional bargaining.
62
 While Getting to YES does 
suggest that a fairer negotiation process might make the outcome of the 
negotiation more durable
63
 or palatable to the parties, there is still a strong 
focus on an instrumental view of process. Better, fairer processes will 
yield better, fairer negotiated outcomes that are more mutually 
advantageous to both parties. 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow‘s extensive work on problem-solving 
negotiation offers a similar perspective on ―typical‖ negotiation. In an 
early and groundbreaking work, she noted the prominence of the 
adversarial model, which relies on a ―win-lose‖ dichotomy and pits parties 
against each other in a zero-sum setting.
64
 The parties in this model are in 
conflict over how to divide a finite pool of resources, and scholars have 
explored what process individuals use to best accomplish this division in 
their favor.
65
 In this widely disseminated vision of negotiation, she 
 
 
 60. See id. at 107. 
 61. After almost thirty years, the Getting to YES approach continues to dominate teaching of 
negotiation. See, e.g., Harold Abramson, Outward Bound to Other Cultures: Seven Guidelines for U.S. 
Dispute Resolution Trainers, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 437, 441–43 (2009); Amy G. Applegate, Brian 
M. D‘Onofrio, & Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, Training and Transforming Students Through 
Interdisciplinary Education: The Intersection of Law and Psychology, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 468, 473 
(2009). 
 62. See FISHER & URY, supra note 51, at xii (―Principled negotiation shows you how to obtain 
what you are entitled to and still be decent.‖).  
 63. See id. at 154. 
 64. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of 
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 784 (1984).  
 65. Id. at 787–89. 
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suggested, the study of process is exclusively geared towards the outcomes 
it yields.
66
  
Menkel-Meadow herself described an alternative model, the problem-
solving model, which has much in common with principled negotiation. In 
the problem-solving model, the emphasis shifts away from win-lose 
negotiation over a fixed pool of resources toward a needs-based 
negotiation that will produce beneficial outcomes that satisfy the desires of 
both parties. Interestingly, despite the fundamental shift in orientation, the 
focus of problem-solving negotiation remains almost exclusively on 
outcomes. The needs of the parties, rather than winning, per se, now 
dominate the discussion, but it is by and large the bottom-line needs of the 
parties, rather than any process-related needs, that are considered. The 
model of negotiation that emerges is based on a process that will best 
achieve the results of satisfying each party‘s primarily economic needs.67 
Menkel-Meadow suggested that there are needs that may not be 
compensable; however, she referred mainly to injuries that cannot be 
redressed through money, such as physical disabilities or damage to 
reputation.
68
  
Menkel-Meadow also highlighted the potential importance of fairness, 
but her focus on fairness is mostly outcome-based. She briefly suggested 
the importance of fair process
69
 but did not fully reflect on the issue. She 
also noted that a negotiator in the alternative model of negotiation could 
 
 
 66. Id. at 793. 
 67. Menkel-Meadow writes:  
 Parties to a negotiation typically have underlying needs or objectives—what they hope to 
achieve, accomplish, and/or be compensated for as a result of the dispute or transaction. 
Although litigants typically ask for relief in the form of damages, this relief is actually a 
proxy for more basic needs or objectives. By attempting to uncover those underlying needs, 
the problem-solving model presents opportunities for discovering greater numbers of and 
better quality solutions. It offers the possibility of meeting a greater variety of needs both 
directly and by trading off different needs, rather than forcing a zero-sum battle over a single 
item. 
Id. at 795.  
 68. Id. at 796. 
 69. Menkel-Meadow states: 
 The justness or rightness of a negotiation can be considered not only from the ends 
produced, but also from the process—the acts of which it consists. This aspect of negotiation 
is beginning to be explored with some seriousness. . . . [T]he question of how one feels about 
the process used to accomplish negotiated solutions is not unrelated to the justness of the 
solution. A problem-solving orientation toward negotiation may lead not only to better 
solutions, but to a process which could be more creative and enjoyable than destructive and 
antagonistic. 
Id. at 817 (footnote omitted). 
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consider how solutions affect relationships between the parties,
70
 as well 
as ethical concerns, such as ―how fair [the parties] desire to be with each 
other.‖71 However, Menkel-Meadow presented an alternative model of 
negotiation that, while offering a dramatically different vision of process 
and outcome than the adversarial model, nonetheless remains largely 
focused on the parties‘ ultimate agreement. 
3. The Economic Approach to Negotiation  
Economic theories of negotiation in the civil justice system share a 
premise: legal actors in the civil system will settle a case if the value of the 
settlement is greater than the expected value at trial, minus transaction 
costs.
72
 If the parties agree on the expected value at trial, all cases will 
settle.
73
 However, parties will not always agree, because they do not have 
perfect information,
74
 the law is uncertain,
75
 or both. If parties had 
complete information and the law was entirely predictable, so that litigants 
could calculate perfectly accurate figures for the expected value at trial, 
then all cases would settle because transaction costs could be saved for 
both sides by avoiding trial.
76
  
In this vision of negotiation, the most important element of a 
negotiation process involves calculating the expected value—or estimated 
outcome—of the case.77 One does this by multiplying particular expected 
outcomes by their probabilities.
78
 Transaction costs must also be 
calculated.
79
 Still another vital piece of negotiation calculation must 
account for any fee-shifting rules.
80
 In this model, it is a crucial element of 
strategy to calculate the opposing party‘s expected value and transaction 
costs so that one can understand the parameters of the ―zone of overlap‖81 
 
 
 70. Id. at 802. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their 
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1071 (1989); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The 
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984).  
 73. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 568–89 (6th ed. 2003); Steven 
Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the 
Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 64 (1982).  
 74. POSNER, supra note 73, at 69–70; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under 
Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 404 (1984).  
 75. POSNER, supra note 73, at 589.  
 76. Shavell, supra note 73, at 64. 
 77. See Priest & Klein, supra note 72, at 9.  
 78. Shavell, supra note 73, at 57–58. 
 79. Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 72, at 1072. 
 80. See Shavell, supra note 73, at 64–67. 
 81. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET‘S MAKE A DEAL 58 (1991).  
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or ―zone of potential agreement‖82—that is, the area that defines the range 
of outcomes that both parties would be willing to accept. The economic 
perspective on settlement negotiation has produced, in turn, a robust 
literature in negotiation on how to define the value of a settlement, how to 
calculate expected value at trial, and how to divine both one‘s own and the 
other party‘s valuation of the settlement in order to calculate the zone of 
possible agreement.
83
 From there, scholars expound on how best to act 
strategically in the negotiation to define the zone of possible agreement to 
one‘s own benefit and to fix the settlement point at the spot most favorable 
to oneself.
84
   
In the past few decades, however, economists have reconsidered the 
purely monetary approach to understanding bargaining. Behavioral law 
and economics scholars have suggested, relying on empirical data, that a 
purely economic definition of utility is not always accurate and that 
individuals place a significant value on fairness in making assessments 
about whether or not to accept outcomes. For example, research in 
economics literature has suggested that there are some economically 
rational outcomes that people will not accept on the grounds that they are 
unfair—that is, people reject outcomes that are economically favorable to 
them because they do not comport with norms of fairness.
85
  
Much of this research uses a dynamic interaction between two parties 
called an ultimatum game, in which one party has the opportunity to split a 
sum of money between himself and another party however he likes. The 
other party then chooses whether to accept the offer, in which case both 
parties get the money, or reject it, in which case neither party receives any 
money.
86
 The consistent findings in this area suggest that many, if not 
 
 
 82. ROY J. LEWICKI, BRUCE BARRY, DAVID M. SAUNDERS & JOHN W. MINTON, NEGOTIATION 
77–78 (4th ed. 2003). 
 83. See, e.g., ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT PEPPET, NEGOTIATION 107–16 
(3d ed. 2006); Jeffrey M. Senger, Decision Analysis in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 729–33 
(2004).  
 84. See, e.g., DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 132–35 
(1986) (discussing the effect of opening offers on the ―bargaining set,‖ or zone of possible agreement).  
 85. RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER‘S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC 
LIFE 75–6 (1992); Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of Fairness Considerations and 
Relationships in a Judgmental Perspective of Negotiation, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 86, 
89 (Kenneth J. Arrow, Robert H. Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky & Robert B. Wilson eds., 1995); 
Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum 
Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982). 
 86. Güth et al., supra note 85, at 371; see also Martin A. Nowak, Karen M. Page & Karl 
Sigmund, Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCIENCE 1773, 1773 (2000) (noting 
that ultimatum game ―has inspired dozens of theoretical and experimental investigations‖); Richard H. 
Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 195 (1988). 
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most, individuals will reject an offer that leaves them financially better off 
but is too lopsided in favor of the other party.
87
 The research omits 
altogether the effect of fairness of process on individuals‘ perceptions of 
the outcome. Instead, even in this research, the process is held constant 
while economists study the effect of varying outcomes. Again, the 
literature focuses on what it presumes is of most importance to negotiation 
participants: the bottom line of the outcome they receive.  
In one example of the economics-based literature on legal negotiation, 
Korobkin surveyed the negotiation literature and, dissatisfied with two 
prominent frameworks (the ―cooperative/competitive‖ model and the 
―integrative/distributive‖ model), developed his own, more economically 
minded ―positive theory of legal negotiation.‖88 Korobkin‘s model rests on 
the premise that ―every action taken by negotiators in preparation for 
negotiations or at the bargaining table fits into one of [two] categories‖: 
the action is related either to definition of the bargaining zone or allocation 
of the negotiation surplus.
89
 Negotiators‘ actions are bound up in 
representing, misrepresenting, or investigating the reservation prices.
90
 
Korobkin addressed the role of what he calls ―procedural fairness,‖ but his 
focus was on particular bargaining behavior, such as exchanging 
concessions or splitting the difference, that will lead to perceptions of 
outcome fairness.
91
 Even behavior during negotiation that ostensibly 
relates to something other than outcome, such as the development of a 
positive personal relationship, can be explained economically under his 
theory: these relationships ―pay dividends in the surplus allocation 
process.‖92 The end goal of all process is economic benefit. 
4. Suggestions About an Independent Role for Procedural Fairness  
Fairness of process in negotiation has drawn a significant amount of 
attention from negotiation scholars, but the focus of this work has almost 
exclusively been on ethics,
93
 rather than the relationship between fairness 
of process and perceptions about the negotiated agreement. Numerous 
 
 
 87. See Güth et al., supra note 85, at 384.  
 88. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 
1790–91 (2000). 
 89. Id. at 1791–92. 
 90. Reservation prices—or reservation points—are the points beyond which a party will not 
settle. Id. at 1791. 
 91. Id. at 1821–25. 
 92. Id. at 1830. 
 93. See, e.g., WHAT‘S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael 
Wheeler eds., 2004) (anthology of essays on ethics and fairness in negotiators).  
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scholars have addressed the nuances of what behavior accords with ethical 
rules and standards in negotiation. However, these discussions do not seek 
to explore the effects of fair processes on participants to negotiation. 
Rather, these are normative discussions about appropriate attorney 
behavior under existing ethical and moral codes.
94
  
In other dispute resolution contexts, the literature examining the effects 
of procedural justice is quite robust: scholars have explored the role of fair 
process in litigation, arbitration, and mediation extensively.
95
 In particular, 
the role of fairness in mediation has captured the imagination of scholars, 
some of whom suggest that parties prefer mediation precisely because it 
affords more procedural justice for its participants.
96
 Others, conversely, 
have questioned whether mediation provides enough procedural justice.
97
 
In negotiation literature, however, there are only a handful of hints about 
the potential role that fair process, or procedural justice, might play.  
In an essay on fairness in negotiation, Welsh suggested that there might 
be an important role for procedural justice in the negotiation setting, but 
noted that empirical research was limited to third-party dispute resolution 
processes and to mediation.
98
 And in a chapter on procedural justice and 
negotiation, Tyler and Blader suggested that there might be an important 
relationship in light of the strong data on the effects of procedural justice 
in mediation (what they call ―negotiation settings presided over by third-
party mediators‖),99 but noted the absence of data in the area and relied 
instead on making inferences from the data on procedural justice in 
 
 
 94. See id. at xiii.  
 95. In litigation, such discussions are not characterized as relating to procedural justice; they are 
typically couched in terms of procedural due process. Similarly, scholars have focused on the 
importance of fair process in arbitration. It is largely in mediation that the psychological phenomenon 
of procedural justice, per se, has been addressed.  
 96. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to 
Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 791–92 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, Making Deals]. However, as 
mediation has grown as a dispute resolution mechanism, lawyers have assumed a greater role in the 
proceedings. Some commentators suggest that mediation may no longer afford the parties as much 
direct voice in the process, giving rise to concerns that procedural justice may not be experienced by 
the parties themselves. See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on 
Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 410 
(2004–2005); Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 3, at 25.  
 97. Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 81, 94, 2002.  
 98. Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 753, 764 (2004) 
[hereinafter Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness]. But see Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 96, at 831–33 
(arguing that procedural justice is not likely to be relevant to negotiation, in contrast to mediation). 
 99. Tyler & Blader, supra note 40, at 302. The link between mediation and negotiation is so 
close that scholars often use the rules in one setting as a jumping-off point for an analysis in the other 
context. See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
691, 695 (2001). 
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mediation.
100
 In past years, ―[v]irtually no attention has been devoted to 
process or procedural fairness‖ in negotiation,101 and when scholars think 
about fairness in negotiation, their focus gravitates towards the fairness of 
the outcome, not the process.
102
 But recent empirical work on procedural 
justice in a bilateral negotiation setting makes the time ripe for redressing 
this gap in the literature.
103
 Before turning to that work, I examine below 
the rules for legal negotiation to explore what, if any, light they shed on 
the role of fair process.  
B. Rules of Legal Negotiation 
The popular vision of negotiation as a competitive, no-holds-barred 
process finds little to contradict it in the rules governing attorney conduct 
in negotiation. As with all conduct by professionals, attorney behavior is 
limited by relevant rules. A lawyer might be tempted to try to win a case 
in court by asking her client to burn all relevant documents rather than turn 
them over in discovery. But in breaking important ethical and court rules, 
that lawyer and client would be subject to severe sanctions, and such 
behavior would ultimately hurt, rather than help, the case. So, too, lawyers 
are constrained by the rules for legal negotiation
104—but, as an 
examination of those rules will show, they are not constrained very much. 
The rules for negotiation are few and far between, and difficult to enforce.  
 
 
 100. Tyler & Blader, supra note 40, at 306. Because mediation is a negotiation that is aided by the 
presence of a third-party facilitator, and is a process, like pure negotiation, in which the control over 
the decision rests in the hands of the disputants, scholars have been comfortable making inferences 
about the effects of procedural justice in negotiation based on mediation research. However, there are 
important distinctions between mediation, in which a third-party neutral typically guides and directs 
the process of decision making between the parties, and negotiation, in which the parties must develop 
their own process for reaching a solution. The presence of a third-party neutral makes extrapolation 
from mediation to the negotiation context empirically uncertain.  
 101. Cecilia Albin, In Theory: The Role of Fairness in Negotiation, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 223, 224 
(1993). 
 102. See, e.g., John Richardson, How Negotiators Choose Standards of Fairness: A Look at the 
Empirical Evidence and Some Steps Toward a Process Model, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 415 (2007).  
 103. Others have also challenged the negotiation ―orthodoxies,‖ just not from the perspective of 
procedural justice. For example, Putnam challenged ―three assumptions‖ of the traditional negotiation 
model: that outcomes are defined instrumentally, that the individual drives negotiation, and that 
―rationality is the privileged way of knowing.‖ She suggested that noninstrumental goals should be 
considered, that emotional and relationship issues matter, and that emotion and feelings can be an 
important source of knowledge. Linda L. Putnam, Challenging the Assumptions of Traditional 
Approaches to Negotiation, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 337, 338, 342 (1994). 
 104. Korobkin, Moffitt, and Welsh have suggested that three categories of rules govern 
negotiation: common law, context-specific law, and professional regulations. See Russell Korobkin, 
Michael Moffitt & Nancy Welsh, The Law of Bargaining, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 839, 839 (2004). My 
analysis relies on rules drawn from all three of these categories.  
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The process of settlement negotiation is governed by few express legal 
rules. Consider the process next to its distant relative, litigation, which is 
governed by highly specific and detailed rules for the presentation of one‘s 
case before a judge. In contrast, there is no set process by which a 
negotiation must occur: no order of appearance; no assigned seats at the 
table; no mandated affirmative presentation, response, and reply in front of 
a party whose job is to listen carefully. There are, simply put, almost no 
rules for most procedural and substantive aspects of the negotiation. In 
negotiation, the most pressing requirement is that both parties must agree 
to the negotiation process and negotiated outcome. If the parties wanted to 
agree to let a game of musical chairs govern their decision making, they 
could do so. 
Nonetheless, there are some rules that govern the outer limits of 
acceptability for legal negotiation. In most jurisdictions, settlements are 
considered to be contracts and are subject, in addition to any specialized 
rules for settlement negotiations, to the rules and principles of contract 
law.
105
 However, the rules governing the negotiation of contracts are fairly 
lax; for example, there is no duty of good-faith negotiation in contract 
law.
106
 The rules applying to settlement negotiation that do exist can be 
broken down into two broad and sometimes overlapping categories: bad 
conduct rules, dealing with misrepresentation or fraud and threats or 
duress during negotiation;
107
 and rules about the substance of negotiated 
agreements, including rules about court-approved settlements. These rules 
are all designed to ensure a minimum level of fairness in the dispute 
resolution process, but, as a review of these rules indicates, the focus is 
largely on outcome and the concerns with process are minimal.
108
  
1. Rules About Bad Conduct  
There are express rules about appropriate conduct for attorneys during 
settlement negotiation. Volumes have been written on the scope of the 
 
 
 105. See, e.g., Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Rainwater Constr. Co., 509 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(Arkansas); Perfumebay.com Inc. v. Ebay Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2007) (California); 
Welch & Forbes, Inc. v. Cendant Corp. (In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig.), 233 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 
2000) (New Jersey); Dunbar Med. Sys., Inc. v. Gammex Inc., 216 F.3d 441, 452 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(Texas). 
 106. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair 
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221 (1987). 
 107. The classic bad-conduct rule about good faith is not applicable in the contract formation 
setting, nor is it relevant to settlement negotiation.  
 108. Settlement negotiation is not self-policing, either; these rules are only enforced when one 
party chooses to bring a challenge to the settlement in court. 
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lawyer‘s leeway to present information, whether accurately or 
inaccurately, during negotiation.
109
 The relevant body of applicable law 
comes from ethical standards for attorneys, which are typically based on 
the ABA‘s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Model Rule 4.1 
expressly prohibits lawyers from making false statements of material fact 
or law and further prohibits lawyers from failing to disclose material facts 
to another person when the disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a 
criminal or fraudulent act by a client. However, these seemingly clear 
mandates against deception have a murky undertow when it comes to 
negotiation. For example, the comment to Rule 4.1(a) explains that context 
can shed light on whether something is a ―statement of fact,‖ and that 
―[u]nder generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of 
statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact.‖110 In 
particular, the comments suggest that ―[e]stimates of price or value placed 
on the subject of a transaction and a party‘s intentions as to an acceptable 
settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category.‖111 In this way, the 
comments to the Rule exempt much of what lawyers talk about in 
negotiation, making a vast swath of lies
112
 exempt from the scope of the 
rules.
113
 Similarly, the text of Rule 4.1 contains an express exemption from 
its disclosure requirements when the relevant disclosure would be 
prohibited by Rule 1.6. Rule 1.6, in turn, requires client consent for such 
disclosure in all cases except those where the disclosure might prevent a 
client from committing a criminal act that ―is likely to result in reasonably 
certain death or substantial bodily harm‖ or when the disclosure would 
occur in the context of a dispute between lawyer and client.
114
 
These rules, then, offer lawyers a broad canvas for making statements 
that are not true in the context of a negotiation because they are not 
understood as statements of ―material fact,‖ and similarly allow attorneys 
to fail to disclose information in many situations. The rules, of course, do 
not mandate that attorneys make any misrepresentations or keep mum, but 
 
 
 109. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer’s Obligation to Be Trustworthy When Dealing 
with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181 (1981); Alan Strudler, On the Ethics of Deception in 
Negotiation, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 805 (1995); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 
75 IOWA L. REV. 1219 (1990); James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying 
in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926.  
 110. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. (2008).  
 111. Id.  
 112. It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a definitive statement on what a lie is; for the 
purposes of this discussion, it is enough to imagine a lie to be an affirmative statement that is untrue.  
 113. Whether or not the license to misrepresent estimates of price and value is appropriate or not 
has been debated by scholars. See, e.g., White, supra note 109, at 933.  
 114. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2008).  
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they do not prohibit attorneys from doing so. By its language, Rule 4.1 
has, indeed, suggested to some that misrepresentations and nondisclosures 
are not only the norm of negotiation, but that they are sanctioned and 
encouraged.
115
 As James J. White has suggested, ―To conceal one‘s true 
position, to mislead an opponent about one‘s true settling point, is the 
essence of negotiation.‖116 While other scholars take a more conservative 
or moralistic approach,
117
 the notion persists that zealous advocacy in 
negotiation requires lawyers to, in some circumstances, affirmatively 
mislead others.
118
  
The scope of Rule 4.1 is not uncontroversial: there is a robust literature 
on the nuances and subtleties of the nature and reach of the rule.
119
 But 
even this literature suggests that there is something more behind the plain 
words of the rule: ethics may be relevant, but ethical behavior may not be 
captured by the terms of the rule and instead must be self-regulated and 
enforced by attorneys.
120
 And yet the scope of the literature on the rule 
itself reveals the absence of one uniform set of ―generally accepted 
conventions‖ in many sticky negotiation disclosure or misrepresentation 
situations. The thin nature of the rule, along with a reliance on individual 
norms and personal understandings of the ethics of misrepresentation, has 
created an uncertain and uneven landscape that has helped to encourage a 
vision of legal negotiation as a forum where ―anything goes.‖121  
 
 
 115. See, e.g., Brian C. Haussmann, Note, The ABA Ethical Guidelines for Settlement 
Negotiations: Exceeding the Limits of the Adversarial Ethic, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1218 (2004). 
 116. White, supra note 109, at 928.  
 117. See, e.g., PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 71 (1998); Michael H. 
Rubin, The Ethics of Negotiations: Are There Any?, 56 LA. L. REV. 447, 476 (1995); Walter W. Steele, 
Jr., Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1402 (1986). 
 118. ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC 
AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 104 (1999); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 3 (2008). 
 119. See, e.g., Nathan M. Crystal, The Lawyer’s Duty to Disclose Material Facts in Contract or 
Settlement Negotiations, 87 KY. L.J. 1055 (1999) (arguing that there are obligations to disclose 
information in negotiation in certain situations, including when the duties of good faith and fair 
dealing require such disclosure); see also Richard K. Burke, “Truth in Lawyering”: An Essay on Lying 
and Deceit in the Practice of Law, 38 ARK. L. REV. 1, 11 (arguing that although the ethical rules 
technically permit lying as long as the other side expects it, it is wrong for them to do so and that 
lawyers ought not to lie) (1984); Burns, supra note 99, at 695–96 (noting ambiguity and complexity of 
interpretation of ethical rules for misrepresentation); Patrick Emery Longan, Ethics in Settlement 
Negotiations: Foreword, 52 MERCER L. REV. 807 (2001) (describing application of various ethical 
rules to a number of hypothetical situations); Gary Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar’s Failure to Require 
Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 412–13 (1988) (describing Rule 4.1 as 
ambiguous).  
 120. See Longan, supra note 119, at 809–10.  
 121. Richard Painter has suggested that law firms could create their own codes of behavior to fill 
in this gap. Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 732–33 (2001). 
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Beyond the prohibition against misrepresentation of material facts, 
attorneys engaged in settlement negotiation may not use duress or 
coercion, per basic contract law. A party may challenge a settlement on the 
basis that he or she was improperly coerced or threatened.
122
 However, 
courts have been quick to limit the scope of this challenge, starting with a 
presumption that settlements conducted by counsel are fairly negotiated.
123
  
2. Court Rules About Settlement  
In most cases, courts have no authority to approve or disapprove a 
settlement agreement between parties—and, indeed, may be barred from 
doing so.
124
 However, courts have limited power to approve or disapprove 
settlement in certain situations. The most notable of these contexts is class 
actions, where a court has heightened scrutiny over the terms of the 
settlement. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a class action 
settlement be approved by a court, in part in order to prevent attorneys 
from agreeing to settlements that provide them with a sizable fee but leave 
the plaintiffs with little.
125
 The standard for judicial approval of class 
action settlements is that the settlement be ―fair, reasonable, and 
adequate‖126 and not ―a product of collusion.‖127 Although courts have 
asserted that in evaluating a class action settlement, ―the court should 
examine the negotiations that led to the settlement, and the substantive 
terms of the settlement,‖128 it is not common for the court to delve 
carefully into the process of the lawyers‘ negotiation.129 Other contexts 
where the court is required to approve a settlement are in derivative 
actions, certain employee actions,
130
 and, in some jurisdictions, cases 
 
 
 122. See, e.g., Brees v. Hampton, 877 F.2d 111, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 123. See, e.g., Tiburzi v. Dep‘t of Justice, 269 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Riley v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 1989).  
 124. See Cullen v. Riley (In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP Litig.), 957 F.2d 
1020, 1025 (2d Cir. 1992) (―Typically, settlement rests solely in the discretion of the parties, and the 
judicial system plays no role.‖); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(repudiating the right of the district court judge to make a notation of ―So Ordered‖ on a settlement 
agreement, stating, ―In ordinary litigation, that is, lawsuits between private parties, courts recognize 
that settlement of the dispute is solely in the hands of the parties‖). 
 125. John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why “Exit” 
Works Better Than “Voice,” 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 412–13 (2008). 
 126. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 127. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 128. Cinelli v. MCS Claim Servs., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 118, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 129. See id. (noting summarily that ―counsel for both parties stated that a productive negotiation 
process led to the settlement in this case‖). 
 130. Cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act, for example, require judicial approval for 
settlement because an employee‘s rights under that Act are not waivable. Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, 
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involving minors
131
 or parties deemed incompetent.
132
 In all of these 
settings, courts focus on the fairness of the outcome that parties receive, 
rarely investigating the underlying negotiations that produce settlements. 
This suggests that the courts‘ focus is on the fairness of the outcome, not 
the fairness of the process, unless fraud or collusion tainted that process. 
In sum, settlement negotiation is governed by a handful of rules, most 
of which are imported wholesale from the contract setting. The main 
import of the rules is that negotiations should not be characterized by 
fraudulent or coercive behavior; beyond that, the rules are mute as to the 
way that a negotiation should progress. It is rare, if ever, that a court will 
disapprove a settlement because of the process of the negotiation, beyond 
fraud and coercion.
133
 The few explicit rules governing negotiation that 
exist do promulgate a fairness norm, largely in terms of outcome and 
occasionally in terms of process, but only at the outside edges. These rules 
set a minimum boundary, beyond which lawyers must chart their own 
ethical path in negotiation. Norms for the legal profession may help fill 
this open space, but there is a lot of room to make different choices even 
within those norms. Because negotiation is so thinly regulated, and differs 
dramatically from litigation, arbitration, and mediation in terms of the 
safeguards afforded, it is easy to imagine it as an arena in which concerns 
about procedural justice and fairness might not be relevant.
134
 In light of 
the paucity of rules governing negotiation and the lack of a third-party 
authority to keep watch over the process, might negotiation be a setting 
where people do not expect or care about procedural justice? In the section 
below, I consider the theoretical soundness of extending procedural justice 
to negotiation and review the empirical work that has been done to date on 
this question.  
 
 
Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence of a Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
1317, 1340 (2008).  
 131. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:44-3 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE § 44-10-14(g) (2002). 
 132. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 44. 
 133. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 96, at 830–31 (noting that courts ―rarely concern 
themselves‖ with elements of settlement negotiation related to procedural justice). 
 134. In some ways, however, the legal negotiation setting is, of all dispute resolution processes, 
most amenable to a psychological analysis. One might characterize legal negotiation, relative to other 
dispute resolution processes, as ―less law, more people,‖ that is, less susceptible to a legal analysis and 
more susceptible to an analysis based on principles of human behavior.  
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III. NEGOTIATION AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
As discussed above, negotiation is often characterized as occurring in 
the ―shadow of the law.‖135 This description acknowledges, however, that 
legal negotiation is not squarely a part of the formal legal system but—
despite its prevalence as a mechanism by which disputes are resolved—
exists on the outer edges of that system. In this section, I explore the 
question of whether procedural justice may even be relevant to 
negotiation, in light of the fact that there is no third-party authority to 
provide some procedural framework or offer a decision, and no set of clear 
rules to govern most of the participants‘ behavior. I then look to the 
empirical work that has been done on the contours of legal negotiation, 
with a specific focus on fairness and negotiation. This section concludes 
by suggesting how procedural justice norms may provide unwritten rules 
for legal negotiation.  
A. Is Procedural Justice Relevant to Negotiation? 
As noted in Part I, procedural justice assessments in third-party 
decision-making processes are guided by perceptions about the 
opportunity to be heard, the trustworthiness of a decision maker, the 
existence of neutral and unbiased decision-making processes, and 
courteous and respectful treatment.
136
 However, the use of the term 
procedural justice in a context where there is no authority involved, and 
few governing rules, may be greeted with some skepticism. How can one 
talk about ―justice‖ in an organic process involving individuals who are 
not subject to procedural rules and who are free to engage or leave the 
negotiation at will?
137
 
First, it is important to remember that ―procedural justice‖ is a term of 
art that describes procedural fairness as it has been developed over more 
than thirty years of social psychology research. It does not carry the full, 
freighted weight of ―justice‖ in a more philosophical sense; it is a carefully 
 
 
 135. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 8. 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 36–40.  
 137. Because there has not, to date, been an in-depth scholarly exploration of the role that 
procedural justice may play in legal negotiation, there is no body of critical literature to which I am 
directly responding. However, I am grateful to participants in faculty workshops at Washington 
University School of Law and the James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona, for their 
arguments and questions with respect to this point. Additionally, Nancy Welsh has offered a brief 
argument as to why procedural justice is not an important feature of negotiation, see Welsh, Making 
Deals, supra note 96, at 831–33, to which I also respond in this section.  
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drawn subset of concerns about fairness, distinct from other types of 
justice such as distributive, restorative, or reparative justice. Procedural 
justice by its own definition in psychology is the subjective experience by 
an individual of the fairness of a decision-making process. It is not likely 
to be controversial that individuals may feel differently with respect to 
fairness about different behaviors encountered in a negotiation setting. 
That is, individuals‘ subjective experiences of the fairness of a negotiation 
are likely to vary, depending on the content of the negotiation and, 
perhaps, individual differences or sensitivity with respect to fairness 
concerns.  
Despite this important definitional caveat, there may be objections to 
the relevance of fair process in bilateral negotiation. Consider two distinct 
economics viewpoints about the fairness of negotiation: first, all 
negotiation is fair, because parties in a free market system would not agree 
to a negotiated outcome unless it was acceptable to them;
138
 second, 
negotiation cannot be characterized as fair or unfair (or just and unjust) 
because it is a purely economic transaction. These viewpoints, despite the 
fact that they seem orthogonal, reflect the same basic view of negotiation. 
It is a transaction that can be characterized by utility theory: rational actors 
interact to produce an agreement to which each party will only agree if the 
utility of the agreement is greater than the utility of the alternative to an 
agreement.
139
 As noted above, economic theories of negotiation in the civil 
justice system share the premise that cases will settle when the value of the 
settlement is greater than the expected value at trial, minus transaction 
costs.
140
 Although it is by no means clear that participants view the 
decision of whether to settle versus continue to litigate in this way, 
negotiation scholars often find economic theories of negotiation 
appropriate and compelling.
141
  
So what is the role for fairness in negotiation? As discussed earlier, 
research has shown that a purely economic definition of utility is not 
accurate; individuals do value fairness in making assessments about 
whether or not to accept outcomes.
142
 In the context of an ultimatum game, 
people will refuse to accept some economically rational outcomes because 
 
 
 138. See, e.g., G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES 
FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE, at xii (1999) (―[A]ll deals that close are win-win deals. The two sides 
would not agree to a proposal unless they thought agreement was better for them than no deal.‖). 
 139. POSNER, supra note 73, at 69. 
 140. Priest & Klein, supra note 72, at 4.  
 141. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 88.  
 142. See sources cited supra note 85. 
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they are viewed as unfair.
143
 The structure of this research on fairness of 
outcome helps to encourage the economists‘ dichotomous vision: if an 
outcome is not fair, parties will not agree, but if parties have agreed, the 
outcome must be fair.
144
  
However, there are two key reasons why this research does not show 
process fairness to be irrelevant. First, economists use a binary structure in 
the ultimatum game that is not sufficiently nuanced to provide a full 
explanation of how parties understand fairness of outcome. The economics 
research is mainly occupied with determining the threshold moment when 
a distribution crosses from fair to unfair, rather than in understanding 
whether, within the category of fair, outcomes may be seen as more or less 
fair. But there is room even for fair agreements to be more or less fair, and 
nothing in the economics literature suggests otherwise. For example, in the 
ultimatum game, dividing ten dollars into six for the divider and four for 
the receiver may be seen as fair, but dividing the ten dollars evenly into 
five for each party may be seen as more fair. Procedural justice may be the 
same: even if one assumes that individuals will not agree to a negotiated 
outcome unless there is a fair negotiation process, that fact alone does not 
render procedural justice considerations moot. Even within the ―fair 
process‖ category, individuals are likely to experience different degrees of 
procedural justice based on the behavior of their adversary. If the choice of 
whether or not to agree to a particular negotiated outcome may depend on 
a binary assessment between fair and unfair process, so too might the 
degree of enthusiasm for acceptance of the agreement and long-term 
adherence to that agreement relate to an assessment about the degree of 
fair process afforded.  
Second, the empirical economics literature simply does not provide a 
sufficiently complex framework to assess the role of fairness of process. A 
focus on outcomes and a demonstration that individuals will not agree to 
some outcomes that are deemed unfair and will agree to others that are 
deemed fair, conducted according to rules in a game that are largely held 
constant, cannot (and does not purport to) support the conclusion that 
fairness of process does not play an important role in fostering acceptance 
of and adherence to agreements.  
 
 
 143. See id.  
 144. Some literature has explicitly suggested that negotiation may not be the right mechanism for 
a dispute that implicates fairness concerns. Perhaps most famously, Owen Fiss argued that settlement 
was inappropriate in some situations, namely when issues of societal justice and fairness were 
concerned. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). 
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Another argument against the role of procedural justice in negotiation 
suggests that individuals will not seek fair treatment in a process in which 
there are no rules for proper conduct. Rules, according to this argument, 
are what provide a benchmark, the departure from which alerts the 
participant that an unfair process is taking place. As discussed above, it is 
true that, unlike in civil litigation, arbitration, or mediation, there are few 
rules in negotiation that must be followed.
145
 However, procedural justice 
in psychology does not refer to the presence or absence of rules that must 
be followed. Rather, procedural justice refers to the subjective sense by 
participants that they have engaged in a process of fair decision making. 
Certainly, deviation from set rules can help to guide individuals‘ 
perceptions about fair and unfair treatment, but the existence of such rules 
is not a prerequisite for forming an opinion about the fairness or unfairness 
of one‘s treatment. Rules that expressly mandate voice, trust, neutrality, 
and courtesy and respect are not always present in every setting, and yet 
procedural justice literature has consistently found that these factors guide 
perceptions about fairness of process. As noted above, it seems 
uncontroversial that different behavior during negotiation will give rise to 
different perceptions of fairness; procedural justice literature suggests that 
the factors that drive individuals‘ judgments about their decision-making 
processes relate to fair treatment and are largely consistent.  
Finally, one might argue that there is no third party present in 
negotiation to provide the independent judgment that may be a predicate to 
an assessment of justice. But this argument assumes its own conclusion. 
There is no requirement in the psychology of procedural justice that a third 
party be involved. Although some of the factors that individuals use to 
assess the fairness of the process seem to relate more readily to a process 
controlled by a third party, such as neutrality or trust, these factors do not 
presume or mandate the presence of a third party. Still other factors, such 
as voice and courtesy and respect, seem even less related to the presence 
of a third party. I consider each of these factors in more detail below. 
Neutrality is a factor that seems critically important when dealing with 
a third-party decision maker, but seems initially irrelevant when dealing 
with a two-party setting in which each party is a partisan (zealous) 
advocate. Indeed, many descriptions of neutrality in the procedural justice 
literature use the term neutral, bias-free decision making, suggesting the 
necessary presence of a third party. However, aspects of neutrality may in 
fact be present in bilateral negotiation: consider the advice of Fisher and 
 
 
 145. See supra Part II.B. 
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Ury in Getting to YES. They recommend reliance on objective criteria—
some external criteria that both parties can agree to—in order to work out 
agreements.
146
 The idea of objective criteria has been ridiculed by some 
who say that the term is completely manipulable and that no such thing as 
truly objective criteria exists.
147
 However, Fisher has defended the use of 
objective criteria, arguing that it makes negotiation more durable, makes 
the process smoother, and makes a variety of outcomes more appealing to 
the parties.
148
  
Similarly, trust is an element that naturally suggests a third-party 
authority. However, trust in the other party to the negotiation certainly 
might be relevant to the perceived fairness of the negotiation process. 
Trusting the other party to the negotiation—believing that he or she is 
telling the truth about important elements of the negotiation, and believing 
that he or she will follow through on commitments made during 
negotiation—seems likely to produce a greater perception that the process 
is fair, just as trust in a decision maker would produce an impression that 
the decision-making process is fair.  
Voice, on the other hand, is an element that immediately seems equally 
relevant to a third-party decision-making process and a bilateral process. 
Although it might be more meaningful to be afforded a voice in a process 
where one might not be able to speak, versus in a setting where voice is 
assumed, there are ways for a party to have more or less voice in a dyadic 
interaction. Feeling listened to, heard, and able to have the opportunity to 
speak are relevant to a dyadic interaction, just as in a more formal 
setting.
149
 Similarly, being treated with courtesy and respect (or 
discourtesy and disrespect) by a third party may not feel terribly different 
than receiving such treatment from the other party to a negotiation. 
Although a neutral third party and a dyadic partner differ in their status 
and authority, it is nonetheless meaningful to experience courtesy and 
respect—or discourtesy and disrespect—from one‘s peer in the legal 
community.  
Finally, the underlying theories for why procedural justice matters to 
people also provide support for the extension of procedural justice to the 
bilateral negotiation setting. Thibaut and Walker‘s instrumental theory, in 
 
 
 146. For example, parties might agree that fair market value is a reasonable benchmark.  
 147. James J. White, The Pros and Cons of “Getting to YES,” 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115, 116–17 
(1984) (essay review).  
 148. FISHER & URY, supra note 51, at xviii; see also Roger Fisher, Comment by Roger Fisher, 34 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 120 (1984).  
 149. In fact, one might argue that one‘s need for voice could be heightened in a setting with only 
two participants.  
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which people value a fair process because it will lead to a fair and 
favorable outcome, is not conceptually limited to a third-party setting. 
Tyler and Lind‘s relational theory may apply even more strongly in a 
dyadic versus a third-party authority setting; lawyers are members of a 
shared legal community, and individuals in dispute with each other are 
often in closer contact with one another and care more about what each 
other thinks than either party would care about what a neutral third party 
might think. It is not unreasonable to imagine that being treated fairly by 
an adversary says a lot about status in a way that is different from—but 
equally important to—what one gleans from an authority figure.150 And 
finally, Van den Bos‘s fairness heuristic theory may be even more relevant 
in the negotiation setting, where there is often secrecy and a lack of 
comparables that make assessing the fairness and favorability of a 
negotiated outcome very difficult.
151
 Even though experienced lawyers 
may have a good sense of the value of a given case, every case is slightly 
different and exact comparisons are rarely possible.  
In sum, a review of the theoretical basis for procedural justice in 
negotiation demonstrates that it is not unreasonable to talk about the 
procedural ―justice‖ of a negotiation, despite its differences from the 
conceptions of justice one might encounter in other settings. Below, I turn 
to the empirical work that has been done to date on the role that fairness of 
process plays in negotiation. This empirical work supports the theoretical 
conclusion reached above that procedural justice may play an important 
role even in a largely unregulated process where a third-party authority is 
not present—that is, in bilateral negotiation. 
B. Empirical Research on Legal Negotiation 
Research on negotiation has focused largely on outcomes. Maximizing 
outcomes has long been understood as the cornerstone of negotiation 
teaching and practice. The economic approach, suggesting that individuals 
want to approach negotiation instrumentally, has found support in both 
popular and scholarly settings.
152
 However, as discussed above, 
 
 
 150. Welsh argues that because a third party is not present, the group-value model is irrelevant, 
which means that there is no expectation of procedural justice. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 
96, at 832. However, again, this argument assumes that individuals can only receive status-relevant 
information from authorities, rather than peers. 
 151. See Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment 
Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 116 (2007) (arguing that confidentiality 
agreements and ―vanishing trials‖ have made it hard for lawyers to set benchmarks for negotiation). 
 152. See, e.g., LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 82, at 3 (stating that goal of the book is for people, 
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negotiation research has suggested that outcome fairness plays an 
important role in how individuals make decisions about accepting or 
rejecting outcomes.
153
 This research has changed the landscape of 
negotiation; it is no longer controversial among scholars of negotiation 
that fairness, and not just the favorability of the bottom line, matters to 
people. But, as noted above, the focus in the research has been almost 
exclusively on fairness of outcome, rather than process,
154
 and most of the 
procedural justice research has taken place in the context of a third-party 
decision maker. Even those scholars that have tried to link procedural 
justice and negotiation have had to rely mainly on research on procedural 
justice and mediation.
155
  
There are, however, a small handful of studies that connect procedural 
justice and bilateral negotiation directly. In light of this small but growing 
body of research on procedural justice effects in bilateral negotiation, the 
time has come for a fuller analysis of the potential relationship between 
procedural justice and legal negotiation, and the implications of that 
relationship. The research in this area has focused on a few distinct but 
related issues surrounding negotiation and procedural justice. One line of 
research examines what kinds of dispute resolution processes people 
prefer and why. Another line explores the effects that experiencing a fair 
process has on individuals‘ assessments of their agreements and their 
negotiation opponent. Finally, some research has considered whether the 
same antecedents for procedural justice in the third-party setting are 
present when there is no neutral third party present. I discuss these three 
lines of research below.  
1. Negotiation and Procedural Preferences 
Thibaut and Walker originally posited that procedural justice was the 
primary guiding factor in individuals‘ choices about what disputing 
 
 
―perhaps most important[ly], [to] be able to obtain better negotiation outcomes than before‖); SHELL, 
supra note 138, at xi (explaining that author‘s goal is to put forth ―ideas and approaches that 
dependably help people achieve superior results at the bargaining table‖). Even books that do 
acknowledge the importance of factors beyond outcome sometimes pitch those factors as trade-offs 
against good outcomes. See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 51, at xviii.  
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 85–87.  
 154. As discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 104–23, fairness of the negotiation 
process has been studied extensively in the context of negotiation ethics. In that arena, fairness of 
process is studied to determine what is ethical, not to determine how it affects participants‘ 
assessments of the negotiation and the negotiated outcome. See WHAT‘S FAIR: ETHICS FOR 
NEGOTIATORS, at xiii–xiv (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 2004).  
 155. See Tyler & Blader, supra note 40, at 302; Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, supra note 98, at 
764. 
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process they would use.
156
 In a supporting study, Lind, Huo, and Tyler 
found that procedural fairness was ―the most powerful predictor‖ of 
procedural preference.
157
 That is, people‘s assessments about the inherent 
fairness of dispute resolution processes predicted their choice of preferred 
process. Of course, people also were guided in their choice of process by 
their assessments of how favorable the process would be to them versus 
their opponent in the dispute, but fairness appeared to be a greater 
motivator in making the choice. In the Lind et al. study, individuals of 
different ethnic backgrounds rated seven different dispute resolution 
processes on how fair the processes were and on which of the processes 
they would prefer for resolving their own disputes. Three out of the four 
ethnic groups studied ranked negotiation as the most preferred method to 
resolve disputes.
158
 The study‘s findings suggested that individuals prefer 
negotiation because of their belief that the process is procedurally fair vis-
à-vis other dispute resolution mechanisms.
159
 This and other similar 
studies
160
 offer support for the basic premise that individuals care about 
the fairness of process, even in the negotiation context, and that, indeed, 
individuals prefer negotiation to other procedures when they believe that 
negotiation will be conducted fairly. 
On the other hand, MacCoun hypothesized that procedural justice 
concerns were at issue when a mandatory arbitration program in New 
Jersey increased rather than decreased the cases that did not settle. 
MacCoun suggested that individuals‘ interest in a fair process drove them 
away from bilateral negotiation to arbitration when it was cheap and easily 
available.
161
 MacCoun concluded that bilateral negotiation was viewed as 
providing less opportunity for procedural fairness than arbitration.
162
 And 
some sociology work in the area of procedural justice and negotiation 
suggests that negotiation per se may be perceived as less fair than other 
mechanisms for distributing goods. For instance, Molm and her colleagues 
 
 
 156. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 7, at 121.  
 157. Lind et al., supra note 17, at 282. 
 158. The ethnic groups studied were African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, 
and European Americans. All but the African Americans ranked negotiation as the most preferred 
method, with persuasion as the second most preferred method; for African Americans, these two 
choices were reversed. Id. at 280. 
 159. Id. at 283. 
 160. Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ Perceptions of Dispute Resolution 
Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63 (2008); 
Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer, Modern 
Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 211 (2004).  
 161. MacCoun, supra note 16, at 171–72. 
 162. Id. 
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found that an exchange of resources where parties negotiated terms of 
agreement was experienced as less fair than an exchange where parties 
engaged in mutual reciprocity—or a simple back and forth.163 Molm 
suggested that, even though negotiation may encapsulate better the tenets 
of procedural justice than reciprocity, the fact that negotiators tend to have 
interests that directly conflict with one another (especially in zero-sum 
settings) increases the likelihood that the parties will make self-serving 
attributions that will cast their negotiation opponent in a more negative 
light.
164
 These studies, taken together, offer an inconclusive answer as to 
whether negotiation is, or is not, a procedurally fair process.
165
 All of the 
studies, however, suggest that individuals are alert to, and care about, the 
fairness of process in dispute resolution, even in the negotiation context.  
2. Effects of Procedural Justice in Negotiation 
Another set of studies looked at procedural justice in negotiation 
specifically, exploring what effect the degree of procedural fairness 
experienced in a negotiation might have on participants‘ perceptions about 
that negotiation process and outcome. In one study by Brockner and his 
colleagues,
166
 individuals participated in a simulated bilateral business 
negotiation and were then asked to rate the fairness of the process of the 
negotiation, as well as their desire to engage in future business dealings 
with the other party. The level of procedural justice experienced in the 
negotiation appeared to predict one‘s desire to engage in future business 
dealings with the other party—that is, the more fair the negotiation process 
an individual experienced, the more likely that individual was to want to 
negotiate again with the other party.
167
  
In that study, the authors measured the effects of procedural justice on 
future dealings, but did not measure or otherwise study the effects of 
procedural justice on acceptance of, or adherence to, the negotiated 
 
 
 163. Linda D. Molm, Nobuyuki Takahashi, & Gretchen Peterson, In the Eye of the Beholder: 
Procedural Justice in Social Exchange, 68 AM. SOC. REV. 128, 148 (2003).  
 164. Id. at 149. 
 165. Perhaps the determination of the fairness level of a negotiation is context specific, or perhaps 
individual differences account for differences in perceptions of fairness.  
 166. Joel Brockner, Ya-Ru Chen, Elizabeth A. Mannix, Kwok Leung & Daniel P. Skarlicki, 
Culture and Procedural Fairness: When the Effects of What You Do Depend on How You Do It, 45 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 138 (2000). The focus of the study was not, per se, negotiation; instead, the authors 
were interested in the difference between individuals from countries with a cultural norm of 
independence (e.g., the United States) or interdependence (e.g., China). Id.  
 167. Id. at 150–53. There was also an effect of outcome favorability on the desire to engage in 
future business dealings—that is, individuals who got outcomes that they rated as ―better‖ also were 
more interested in negotiation with the other party in the future. Id. at 153. 
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agreement at hand.
168
 In recent research, Tyler and I explored the question 
of what effects the perception of fair treatment during negotiation might 
have on the acceptance of and adherence to the negotiated agreement, as 
well as on positive feelings about the negotiation and perceptions of 
collaboration.
169
 We found that in a simulated legal negotiation, law 
students in the role of attorneys in a contract dispute were more 
enthusiastic about recommending a negotiated settlement to their client 
when they experienced greater levels of procedural justice in the 
negotiation.
170
 We measured this enthusiasm in an effort to capture the 
degree to which the parties accepted, and in turn were likely to adhere to, 
the negotiated agreement.
171
 Additionally, the law students reported that 
the negotiation process was more collaborative, and that they had a more 
positive experience during the negotiation, when the negotiations were 
characterized by procedural fairness.
172
 Procedural justice was not the only 
factor that made a difference in levels of acceptance, positive feelings 
during the negotiation, and the perception of collaborativeness 
experienced during the negotiation.
173
 Measures of outcome favorability—
that is, how good the participants thought the agreement was—also had 
significant effects on acceptance and good feelings; measures of 
distributive justice—that is, how fair the negotiated outcome was—had 
significant effects on acceptance, good feelings, and collaborativeness.
174
  
Tyler and I also examined the relationship between procedural justice 
and monetary outcome in two separate studies—one in which integrative 
 
 
 168. In the mediation context, Pruitt and colleagues found that procedural justice was a stronger 
predictor of adherence to a mediated agreement six months after the mediation than happiness with the 
outcome of the mediation. Pruitt et al., supra note 25, at 327. 
 169. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural 
Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473, 478–79 
(2008).  
 170. Id. at 484. 
 171. Id. at 478. Because the study was a simulation in which the students did not need to report 
back to a real client, there was no way to measure actual client acceptance, nor was there any way to 
track short- or long-term adherence to the agreement. However, the acceptance variable included 
measurement of how strongly the participants would recommend to their clients that the agreement 
should be accepted and how likely they thought it was that the agreement formed the basis of a good 
long-term outcome.  
 172. Id. at 484. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. 483–85. There was an effect of distributive justice (or outcome fairness) on feelings only 
in the individual, not the dyadic, analysis. That is, subject assessments of fairness of outcome mattered 
for individuals‘ judgments of how positively they felt during the negotiation, but relative differences in 
outcome fairness did not have a significant effect on relative positive feeling. Additionally, joint 
perceptions of outcome fairness did not have a significant relationship to the joint good-feeling ratings 
of the dyad.  
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potential was low (a largely zero-sum negotiation), and one in which the 
integrative potential was higher (there was opportunity for ―expanding the 
negotiation pie‖). In the low-integrative-potential negotiation, there was 
no relationship between procedural fairness and actual outcome; in the 
higher-integrative-potential negotiation, higher levels of procedural justice 
were significantly related to a more even distribution of the surplus that 
was created.
175
 This research suggests that there is no systematic 
relationship between fair treatment and outcome in a zero-sum setting: the 
feeling that one has been fairly treated during a negotiation has no 
connection to doing well or poorly on the substance of the negotiation. 
Fair treatment, then, does not appear systematically to ―bamboozle‖ 
people into accepting poor outcomes, nor does fair treatment 
systematically seem to ensure a favorable outcome. In an integrative 
setting, fair treatments‘ effects on outcome are limited to the distribution 
of any surplus that is created, and these effects tend toward an equal 
distribution of that surplus. 
Our findings suggest that the procedural justice experienced in the 
negotiation plays a significant role in shaping how individuals assess their 
negotiated outcomes, and, specifically for individuals in the role of 
lawyers, how they think about a recommendation to accept or reject a 
settlement. If, in fact, subjective experiences of fairness during negotiation 
play a significant role in shaping lawyers‘ recommendations about 
acceptance of settlement, this suggests that lawyers who engage in 
negotiations characterized by higher levels of procedural justice are more 
likely to recommend settlements to their clients. This finding would 
indicate that an attorney who treats opposing counsel in a manner that 
produces a subjective perception of fair process is more likely to reach an 
accepted settlement, all other things being equal, than one whose behavior 
gives rise to a perception of unfair treatment.  
3. Procedural Justice Antecedents in Negotiation 
What does it mean to be fair in negotiation? That is, what are the 
factors that will produce a subjective perception of fair process by the 
other party to the negotiation? There has been, to date, only limited 
empirical research on the role that voice, courtesy and respect, trust, and 
neutrality play in making procedural justice assessments in the negotiation 
context, but a review of this research at least helps begin to answer this 
 
 
 175. Id. at 488.  
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question. In one of the first studies to explore whether a relationship 
existed between negotiation and procedural justice, Lind, Tyler, and Huo 
sought to test whether the procedural justice relationships found in third-
party dispute resolution processes were also at work in dyadic disputing 
procedures. Specifically, the researchers were interested in how people 
would determine whether a dyadic process was fair or not and whether it 
would differ from that same determination in a third-party process.
176
 The 
authors hypothesized that relational considerations of neutrality, trust, and 
status recognition
177
 would play an important role in forming procedural 
justice judgments in the dyadic dispute resolution setting just as they do in 
third-party authority settings. They suggested that because dyadic 
disputing procedures have no assurance of neutrality, parties to such a 
process would be more concerned about neutrality in the dyadic setting. 
They also hypothesized that status recognition might be a more important 
variable in procedural justice assessments in the two-party context than in 
the third-party authority context, and that trust might be less important in 
assessing procedural justice in the dyadic setting than in the third-party 
setting. Lind et al.‘s results supported their hypotheses: parties appeared to 
care more about neutrality, more about courtesy and respect, and less 
about trust in a two-party negotiation than in a setting with a decision 
maker.
178
 
In our research, Tyler and I found that law students made an 
assessment about the fairness of the negotiation based on three out of the 
four traditional foundations of procedural justice: voice, trust, and courtesy 
and respect. In other words, individuals engaged in bilateral negotiation in 
the legal context formed procedural justice judgments that related 
significantly to the level of trust they had in the other party, the courtesy 
and respect with which they were treated in the negotiation, and the degree 
to which they felt they were able to express themselves in the negotiation. 
However, in contrast to the Lind, Tyler, and Huo research discussed 
above, our research provided no support for the hypothesis that parties did 
not care about trust or for the premise that neutrality was a particularly 
important component of procedural justice judgments in negotiation. In 
 
 
 176. E. Allan Lind, Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Procedural Context and Culture: Variation in 
the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 767, 768 
(1997).  
 177. Status recognition in this context is similar to treatment with courtesy and respect. 
 178. Lind et al., supra note 176. Lind et al. also found that the degree to which individuals felt that 
they had a voice in the dispute resolution process had an effect on procedural justice in the dyadic 
setting, although this effect was largely mediated by the relational variables they studied. Id. at 773. 
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fact, we did not find a significant relationship between procedural justice 
judgments and the degree to which the negotiation process was neutral.  
This finding, although not predicted, seems plausible in light of the fact 
that legal negotiation takes place in the adversary system, in which each 
attorney is meant to be a zealous advocate for his or her client. In this 
context, it would be surprising to find either party to a bilateral negotiation 
acting neutrally—indeed, it could potentially be a violation of the lawyer‘s 
duty to the client, or malpractice. It is thus understandable that parties 
would have little or no expectation of neutrality and, in thinking about the 
fairness of the negotiation process, would not consider the degree of 
neutrality present in the negotiation to be particularly relevant.
179
  
Current research thus suggests that determinations about the fairness of 
a negotiation process are governed, at least, by the degree to which 
participants feel that they have a voice in the negotiation and the level of 
courtesy and respect with which they feel they have been treated. Research 
is still inconclusive, however, on the role of both trust and the degree of 
neutrality present in the negotiation process. Taken together with the 
findings that people want to negotiate, in part, because they believe 
negotiation is a fair process,
180
 and that people who experience a 
procedurally fair negotiation are more likely to be enthusiastic about 
accepting the negotiated agreement,
181
 research suggests that ensuring that 
one‘s opponent in a negotiation has the opportunity to express herself, 
treating one‘s opponent with courtesy and respect, and, possibly, acting 
trustworthy or neutral, may have significant positive benefits. There may 
be relatively worse results, in terms of acceptance and adherence, when 
one does not afford one‘s opponent an opportunity for voice, courteous 
and respectful treatment, and, possibly, a basis for trust or evidence of 
absence of bias.  
If opportunity for voice, courteous and respectful treatment, and 
perhaps trust and neutrality play critical roles in guiding participants‘ 
assessments of procedural justice, the next important question is: what are 
the behaviors that will actually lead to positive assessments about these 
factors? More research is needed on what actual, specific behaviors in 
negotiation give rise to the perception by a negotiator that she has had the 
opportunity for voice, has been treated with courtesy and respect, has a 
trustworthy negotiation counterpart, and has engaged in a bias-free 
 
 
 179. However, because there is conflicting data on this point, it is impossible at present to assess 
the role of neutrality in subjective perceptions of procedural justice in the negotiation context. 
 180. See supra text accompanying note 176.  
 181. See supra text accompanying note 169. 
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process. Would interrupting someone deprive them of an opportunity for 
voice? Would active listening provide a heightened sense of voice? 
Perhaps courtesy and respect norms are different for lawyers in different 
types of practice, or in different legal communities. And being trustworthy 
or bias-free may be demonstrated by resorting to the objective criteria 
recommended by Fisher and his colleagues, or perhaps by using outside 
standards such as legal cases and arguments. On the other hand, using 
objective criteria or legal arguments might be perceived as contentious and 
partisan rather than neutral. The particular behavior that will give rise to 
the experience of the antecedents of procedural justice is not yet clear. 
Research at the intersection of negotiation and procedural justice is still in 
its early stages, but this is a critical area for future exploration.  
IV. THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE GAP BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND CLIENT IN 
NEGOTIATION 
In thinking about procedural justice in legal negotiation, there are at 
least two major concerns that need to be addressed.
182
 First, in most legal 
dispute resolution processes, there are set rules. In legal negotiation, in 
contrast, as noted in Part II above, there are very few such defined rules. 
For that reason, the lawyer may not expect, predict, or understand that 
fairness norms are at work in negotiation; the attorney‘s assumptions may 
differ from the concept that the layperson brings to lay, rather than legal, 
dispute resolution. In my study with Tyler, the participants were not 
practicing attorneys, but students engaged in a simulation of a legal 
negotiation. Their perceptions may be more like lay perceptions than legal 
actors‘ would be. This leaves as an open question how relevant procedural 
justice is in the context of legal negotiation conducted by sophisticated 
lawyers.  
Secondly, there is a fundamental difference between negotiation and 
the legal dispute resolution settings where procedural justice has 
previously been found to have a significant effect. Namely, most research 
has explored the role of the procedural justice experienced by the 
disputant. The negotiation research suggests that the experience of 
procedural justice impacts assessments about the negotiated outcome, but 
implicitly assumes a unitary character for both experience of fairness and 
later acceptance. In legal negotiation, however, the legal disputant is 
typically not a party to the substance of the negotiation. Clients are not 
 
 
 182. As noted, another concern is that we need further research on what behavior, exactly, will 
give rise to perceptions about the relevant antecedents of procedural justice. 
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always—or even often—present during the process of the negotiation of a 
settlement, leaving such negotiation to the attorneys they have hired.
183
 So 
the procedural justice—or the fairness of process—experienced during the 
negotiation may, in fact, be experienced by the client‘s agent rather than 
the client herself. Imagine two hypothetical lawyers engaged in the same 
negotiation and faced with the same settlement package.
184
 One lawyer is 
engaged in a negotiation process that she perceives as procedurally fair, 
and the other lawyer is engaged in a negotiation process that she perceives 
as less procedurally fair. As described in Part III.B.2 above, psychological 
research suggests that the first lawyer will be more enthusiastic about the 
settlement offer and more likely to recommend the settlement to her client.  
Because clients are likely to be influenced strongly by the 
recommendation of the lawyer,
185
 one might conclude that clients are 
therefore more likely to accept settlements when the negotiation process is 
characterized by procedural justice. But, to the extent that the fairness of 
treatment during negotiation makes a difference, that difference will be 
felt by an attorney rather than a principal. This is a significant departure 
from the other settings where procedural justice is typically discussed, 
such as litigation, where a client is present in the courtroom, or mediation, 
which is a process designed explicitly to address the personal and 
emotional needs of the parties and typically requires the participation of 
the principals.  
 
 
 183. This same concern has preoccupied mediation scholars, who worry that the voice 
experienced by a party is attenuated by the growing role of the lawyer in mediation. See Welsh, 
Thinning Vision, supra note 3.  
 184. Throughout this discussion, I will assume a scenario in which procedural justice levels differ 
while the negotiated outcome remains constant; this is a reasonable inference in light of Tyler‘s and 
my finding that procedural justice and outcomes had no relationship in the zero-sum negotiation 
setting, supra note 175. Note, however, that in the integrative bargaining setting, we did find a 
relationship between procedural justice and outcome, such that the surplus created was split more 
evenly between the parties.  
 185. Of course, lawyers may exercise different degrees of influence on their clients, see Donald G. 
Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered 
Advocacy in the Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA L. REV. 811, 839–42 (1987), but there is widespread 
agreement on the presence of influence. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through 
Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 664 (1976); Herbert M. 
Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectations, Settlement Realities, and 
Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 795, 796–98 (1998); 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
349, 364 (2008) (―[I]t is not unlikely that a client‘s attorney will have considerable influence on the 
client‘s settlement decisions.‖). Empirical support for the premise was provided by Russell Korobkin 
& Chris Guthrie, Psychology,  Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 
TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997). 
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These two concerns raise a host of questions. First, are lawyers 
differently situated from clients such that they will not feel the same 
procedural justice effects? That is, are they trained professionals who are 
insulated from the effects of fair treatment by virtue of their experience 
and training? Second, if we do assume that lawyers will feel the effects of 
fair treatment, what ethical concerns does this raise in terms of lawyers‘ 
role as agents? Will lawyers pass on procedural justice effects that are 
illusory, giving their clients less financial gain
186
 but enabling them to be 
happier about it, even though the clients are not able to reap the 
(intangible) benefit of the procedural justice? Should attorneys 
communicate the procedural justice elements of the negotiation so that the 
client can experience them vicariously? Or should the client attend the 
negotiation so that whatever the fairness effects, the client is able to 
experience them directly? These questions are addressed in turn below. 
A. Will Lawyers Experience Procedural Justice Differently than Clients? 
With respect to the question of whether lawyers will experience 
procedural justice in a different manner than their (largely laypeople) 
clients, the data are inconclusive. In Tyler‘s and my study on procedural 
justice in negotiation, the subjects were first-year law students who were 
not yet fully socialized as lawyers and had little experience negotiating 
civil disputes on behalf of clients.
187
 It is certainly possible that lawyers 
would experience diminished procedural justice effects in negotiation; 
sometimes, research shows, lawyers do respond quite differently than 
parties to cues in negotiation. For example, Robbennolt, studying apology 
in civil disputes, found that parties to a simulated dispute over a bicycle 
accident who were offered apologies had lower aspiration levels, 
reservation points, and ―fair settlement‖ targets than parties who were not; 
in contrast, lawyers who were given the same information about the 
dispute and asked to provide these same figures on behalf of the injured 
party had higher aspiration levels, reservation points, and ―fair settlement‖ 
targets when an apology was offered.
188
 On the other hand, in that setting, 
the apology was directed to the party, not to the attorney, and the apology 
additionally had evidentiary value with respect to fault finding so that the 
 
 
 186. As noted above, however, research has not shown a relationship between outcome and 
procedural fairness in zero-sum negotiations. Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 169, at 490. 
 187. Id. at 479–80. 
 188. Robbennolt, supra note 185, at 379–80. 
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attorney understood the apology to bolster the merits of the substantive 
case.
189
  
In the procedural justice setting, attorneys are interacting with other 
attorneys, members of their own community. Their experience in 
negotiation, with respect to the interpersonal processes related to 
procedural justice, is about the way that they themselves are being treated, 
rather than about the treatment of the client. The treatment of the client, in 
any event, is likely to appear to the attorney largely as a question of 
distributive justice: because the client is not present at the negotiation, the 
―treatment‖ of the client will likely be imputed from the discussion over 
the substance of the client‘s claim. The client herself cannot have voice in 
the negotiation if she is not present, and the client‘s perspective on 
trustworthiness and neutrality is likely to be conflated with the attorney‘s 
own perceptions, unless some special circumstances make the status of the 
client and attorney dramatically different. The client could, conceivably, 
be treated with discourtesy and disrespect (or courtesy and respect) in a 
manner distinct from the treatment received by the attorney, but this seems 
unlikely to be a high-frequency occurrence.  
The underlying theoretical model for procedural justice‘s importance 
sheds some light on when procedural justice effects are or are not likely to 
be felt by lawyers as opposed to other negotiation participants. The 
Thibaut and Walker theory, suggesting that individuals care about fairness 
because they believe that fairness of process is likely to lead to fairness of 
outcome, would suggest that lawyers would care about fairness of process: 
if lawyers experience a fair process, they may believe that their outcomes 
are better as a result of that process. The Tyler and Lind group-value 
model would offer even stronger support for the idea that lawyers would 
be influenced by procedural justice: people care about the treatment they 
receive because it reflects their status in a group. Lawyers, one might 
argue, are status conscious,
190
 and to the extent that interactions with a 
peer lawyer might reflect on their status in the legal community, such 
interactions will be important to them. Finally, fairness heuristic theory, 
suggested by Van den Bos, is less conclusive. The idea that people use 
fairness to judge negotiation outcomes in the face of their own uncertainty 
about the outcomes might suggest that lawyers should be relatively 
insulated from these effects because lawyers‘ experiences with similar 
cases over time, and knowledge of other cases that fellow lawyers have 
 
 
 189. See id. at 380. 
 190. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney 
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1355 (1997). 
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handled, will provide them with an objective benchmark by which to 
evaluate their numerical outcomes. In that case, fairness of treatment 
should be of less importance to lawyers‘ perceptions about their negotiated 
outcomes. On the other hand, every case is uniquely situated, and there is 
no way to directly map a case onto other cases to precisely measure the 
worth of the particular case at hand. For that reason, procedural justice 
might serve as a useful heuristic to evaluate outcomes in the absence of 
objective markers. A middle-ground position might suggest that although 
lawyers do have some sense of how to value outcomes on an objective 
scale, the interstices of ambiguity are filled by procedural justice as a 
heuristic device. Certainly, although I suggest here that lawyers are not 
likely to be fully immune from procedural justice effects, further 
exploration of this question through field research is warranted.  
B. The Ethics of Procedural Justice in an Agency Relationship 
To the extent that lawyers do feel an effect of fairness of treatment, 
such an effect calls into question their ethics as agents for an unaffected 
principal. Imagine, for example, the following hypothetical scenario: an 
attorney, receiving very fair treatment during a negotiation, is enthusiastic 
about the agreed-upon outcome. To the degree that the enthusiasm 
depends on the fairness of the treatment, which only the attorney received, 
is it ethical for the lawyer to pass along her enthusiasm about the 
agreement to the client? Should the lawyer allow the fairness of the 
treatment she received to affect her perception of the case, even when the 
client did not share in the harm or the benefit of that treatment?
191
  
This tension between the principal and agent is at the heart of legal 
negotiation theory.
192
 The simple framework of bilateral negotiation is 
 
 
 191. Of course, all manner of other outside factors may shape the lawyer‘s perception of the case 
as well. As William H. Simon explains, ―effective lawyers cannot avoid making judgments in terms of 
their own values and influencing their clients to adopt those judgments.‖ William H. Simon, The Dark 
Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-
Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1102 (1994). In turn, these judgments unconsciously find 
their way into communication with the client: ―Even where they think of themselves as merely 
providing information for clients to integrate into their own decisions, lawyers influence clients by 
myriad judgments, conscious or not, about what information to present, how to order it, what to 
emphasize, and what style and phrasing to adopt.‖ William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client 
Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 217 (1991) (citation omitted).  
 192. Mnookin et al. suggest that this tension is one of three critical tensions in negotiation, along 
with the tension between creating and claiming value and the tension between empathy and 
assertiveness. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND 
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 9–10 (2000). There is some 
question about how well agency theory maps onto the attorney-client relationship in all contexts, 
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considerably complicated by the addition of agents performing negotiation 
on behalf of principals.
193
 There is a wide range of ways in which the 
attitudes and actions of agents and principals may clash, leading to 
misalignments and problems within the negotiation setting. Mnookin et al. 
have suggested that there are three areas where principals and agents 
might differ in meaningful ways: preferences, incentives, and 
information.
194
 Preferences may differ between agent and principal when, 
for instance, an agent is a repeat player whose preference is to maintain a 
good relationship with the other party, while the principal is a one-shot 
player whose preference is to maximize economic gain.
195
 The literature 
on the role of agents in negotiation is rife with discussion of the perverse 
problems in aligning incentives that can result from agents‘ fee 
structures.
196
 For example, an attorney paid hourly has some incentive to 
continue to negotiate, or to refuse to negotiate, rather than settle, as a case 
moves toward trial; an attorney working on a contingency fee basis may 
be more likely to want to settle a case before expending more hours.
197
 
Finally, parties may have very different information; for example, an agent 
might be well aware of whether a proposed settlement is above or below 
average in a particular type of case or jurisdiction, but the principal may 
not have this benchmark for settlement evaluation. This may lead to 
distortions in what the principal is willing to accept in a given situation.  
On the other hand, agents offer significant added value in some 
respects, not just because they bring to the table specialized knowledge 
 
 
however. For example, courts and commentators suggest a clear difference in the way that decisions 
are handled for substantive versus procedural matters, with clients retaining final authority in 
substantive matters and attorneys exercising final authority with respect to procedural decisions. 
William R. Mureiko, Note, The Agency Theory of the Attorney-Client Relationship: An Improper 
Justification for Holding Clients Responsible for Their Attorneys’ Procedural Errors, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
733, 739–40 (1988). In this way, agency theory does not fully account for the increased role that 
attorneys play in procedural decisions. Whether to accept a settlement, however, seems likely to fall 
within the ambit of substantive decisions, where the client retains final decision-making authority. This 
makes a conflict between agent and principal in this setting all the more problematic.  
 193. Indeed, ―most accounts of lawsuit settlement . . . share the simplifying assumption that 
litigation is a two-party activity carried out by a plaintiff and a defendant.‖ Korobkin & Guthrie, supra 
note 185, at 81. 
 194. MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 192, at 75. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, How Would You Like to Pay for 
That? The Strategic Effects of Fee Arrangements on Settlement Terms, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 53 
(1996); Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1996); Korobkin & 
Guthrie, supra note 185, at 122–23; Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 189, 190 (1987) (analyzing effect on settlement incentives of differences in contingency 
fee versus hourly fee structures); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and 
Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979).  
 197. MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 192, at 83–84. 
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that they can share with the client or particularized negotiation skills,
198
 
but because they are able to act more rationally and dispassionately than 
their clients,
199
 especially in the case of dispute resolution, where the 
parties are often engaged in some type of disagreement that has become 
heated. In particular, those who have considered the psychology of 
negotiation have suggested that lawyers might be very helpful because 
they are able to be less emotional than their principals,
200
 and lawyers 
might be subject to less cognitive bias than their principals.
201
  
In the context of procedural justice, the tension between what an 
economist might call an attorney‘s ―revealed preference‖ for fair treatment 
in negotiation and a client‘s likely stated preference to maximize outcome 
is problematic. In some ways, it reflects the worst of both worlds: on the 
one hand, we rely on lawyers to judge and assess the favorability of a 
settlement offer, and on the other hand we expect lawyers to be free from 
the ―emotional‖ bias that we know parties bring to a dispute. Yet, in this 
instance, we have the potential for lawyers‘ subjective perceptions of the 
treatment they have received to lead to changes in their evaluation of a 
settlement outcome.  
One possibility that may mitigate this tension is that some of the 
procedural justice experienced in the negotiation will be passed along to 
the client. Although there is no empirical data on the point, it seems 
plausible that attorneys would communicate some of the facts surrounding 
the negotiation process to their clients.
202
 For example, an attorney might 
 
 
 198. MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 146 (1992); 
Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E. A. Sander, When Should We Use Agents? Direct vs. Representative 
Negotiation, 4 NEGOTIATION J. 395, 396 (1988); see also MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 192, at 71 
(suggesting that the benefits of using an agent stem from four sources: knowledge, resources, skills, 
and strategic advantages).  
 199. Rubin & Sander, supra note 198, at 397. 
 200. Id. Note, though, that it is not clear which direction this emotional ―outsourcing‖ may cut. 
For example, one person may hire an attorney because she herself is so hostile and unyielding that any 
negotiation would falter, but another person may hire an attorney because she is afraid that she will be 
too nice to the other party.  
 201. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2520 (2004); Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 185, at 87–88. But see Rebecca Hollander-
Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 
173 (2007) (citation omitted) (summarizing other research that ―suggests that attorneys are not 
systematically free from bias‖). 
 202. The nature of the communication between attorney and client is the subject of significant 
scholarly investigation. William L. F. Felstiner & Ben Pettit, Paternalism, Power, and Respect in 
Lawyer-Client Relations, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 135, 146–47 (Joseph Sanders 
& V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) (reviewing literature on the interaction between lawyer and client). For 
the purpose of this Article, I assume a somewhat straightforward relationship in which information can 
be shared easily (or, can be withheld easily)—that is to say, at the least, a relationship in which 
communication may be used strategically and self-consciously, despite the fact that this may not be the 
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2010] JUST NEGOTIATION 427 
 
 
 
 
explain a settlement offer in context, noting the behavior of the opposing 
counsel as part of that offer. Statements such as, ―I barely had a chance to 
get a word in edgewise,‖ or ―The other lawyer really wanted to hear why 
our demand was [x],‖ might lead to the client‘s formation of an opinion 
with respect to voice. The voice, of course, is attenuated, because it is the 
attorney‘s voice rather than the client‘s. However, since the attorney is the 
client‘s agent, speaking on behalf of the client, it is reasonable that the 
client has some identification with and interest in the attorney‘s ability to 
have voice during the negotiation process.
203
 Similarly, lawyers might pass 
on impressions relating to trust in the other lawyer, the other party, or 
both; lawyers may know each other from other cases and pass along 
previously formed opinions about integrity and trustworthiness, or may 
relate incidents from negotiation that heighten or decrease trust in the 
other side. Likewise, when explaining the criteria that form the basis for 
the settlement, attorneys may explain more or less some objective basis for 
the negotiated outcome, leading to higher or lower perceptions of 
neutrality from the client. Finally, if another lawyer is discourteous or 
disrespectful, it seems quite likely that the client‘s lawyer will mention 
this as part of the debriefing process after a negotiation session. So it may 
be that some clients experience a transitive procedural justice effect based 
on the report given by their lawyers.
204
 
In contrast, a sophisticated lawyer could deliberately mask the 
procedural justice of a negotiation in order to serve her own goals. For 
instance, a lawyer could experience very low procedural fairness, but, 
knowing that a client may more readily accept an agreement that comes 
out of a fair negotiation process, the lawyer could deliberately not pass on 
details about the process or could affirmatively mislead the client about 
 
 
case in every lawyer-client relationship. Some scholars have suggested that the relationship between 
lawyers and clients, itself, may be characterized by procedural justice concerns, adding yet another 
layer to the complexity of understanding the role of procedural justice in legal negotiation. Id. at 139. 
The procedural justice of a negotiation may, indeed, be less relevant to a client than the procedural 
justice afforded by her lawyer.  
 203. Indeed, there is no difference between this and voice in the litigation context; attorneys 
represent clients in court unless the parties are pro se. Studies of the litigation context finding voice an 
important element of parties‘ assessments of procedural justice do not rely solely on the actual voice 
of the parties, understanding that the lawyer‘s voice is a proxy for that of the client. See Welsh, 
Making Deals, supra note 96, at 841. 
 204. It is important to note here the obvious fact that attorneys are all different, with different 
styles of practice and different personalities. Some commenters have suggested to me that most 
attorneys will of course discuss these features of a negotiation with a client, while other readers have 
expressed disbelief that any lawyer would do so. This suggests that such conversations between 
lawyers and clients do sometimes—but by no means always—occur.  
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the fairness of the process.
205
 Conversely, the lawyer could experience 
very high procedural fairness himself, but, when relaying the settlement 
offer to the client, could omit a description of the process or could 
describe the process negatively. Lawyers might be motivated to do these 
things for any number of reasons: they might explicitly, on principle, want 
the process to be irrelevant to a consideration of outcome, or they might 
have other reasons for wanting a client to accept or reject a settlement. 
Thus procedural justice effects in negotiation could give rise to ethical 
problems due to a clash of incentives between lawyer and client.  
Part of the problem with understanding the effects of procedural justice 
in this context—even if transmitted clearly and having a transitive effect 
from attorney to client—is that it is hard to know what incentives 
individuals have with respect to fairness. In particular, procedural justice 
may not always be the kind of concern that people are likely to articulate 
prior to a negotiation. A host of psychological research suggests that 
people are not that good at knowing what will make them feel happy or 
satisfied.
206
 And, in particular, individuals have temporally differential 
preferences for fair treatment.
207
 So, for example, some research has 
suggested that someone facing an upcoming negotiation may believe that 
he or she would care most about finding a process that would yield a huge 
sum of money, and very little about how fairly he or she was treated. But, 
after the negotiation, the fairness of treatment matters quite a lot to that 
individual, perhaps even more than the favorability of the outcome.
208
 
However, the nature of this temporal paradigm is such that it would be 
impossible for a principal to communicate accurately, ex ante, about her 
preferences ex post.  
On the other hand, a client might, both ex ante and ex post, care very 
little about how his or her agent was treated during the negotiation. And 
this would be a preference that could be clearly communicated. Indeed, it 
 
 
 205. This concern about the potential for procedural justice to ―blind‖ a party to a disadvantageous 
outcome is not new. A host of scholars have suggested that a focus on procedural justice may lead to a 
―false consciousness‖ problem in which individuals are contented with a fair process when that fair 
process masks a substantively unfair or unfavorable outcome. MacCoun, supra note 16, at 189–91 
(reviewing literature on the link between procedural justice and false consciousness).  
 206. See, e.g., DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006).  
 207. See Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 160, at 64; Tom R. Tyler, Yuen J. Huo & E. Allan Lind, 
The Two Psychologies of Conflict Resolution: Differing Antecedents of Pre-Experience Choices and 
Post-Experience Evaluations, 2 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 99, 114–16 (1999). But see 
Lind et al., supra note 176, at 759 (suggesting that people find negotiation an appealing procedure 
precisely because of its fairness). The somewhat conflicting research on this point suggests that more 
definitive empirical exploration is needed to understand how much individuals value fairness before 
they engage in decision making.  
 208. Tyler et al., supra note 207, at 106. 
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could be that one critical reason why people hire lawyers is so that they do 
not have to worry about the fairness of their treatment at the hands of 
others. Clients may retain attorneys to negotiate on their behalf precisely 
because, like emotional entanglement, procedural fairness is a concern that 
clients want to eliminate from the dispute resolution process.  
If clients expressly want their agents not to care about procedural 
fairness, just as clients want their agents not to be emotionally caught up 
in their dispute, could such a desire be honored by the agent? Assume 
three clients: Client A cares about the fairness of treatment during 
negotiation ex ante and ex post; Client B cares about fairness during 
negotiation only ex post;
209
 Client C does not care about fairness during 
negotiation in either temporal frame. For the attorney who experiences 
procedural justice effects, what are the possibilities? In the case of Client 
A, the attorney can accurately describe the fairness of the treatment that 
she experienced during the negotiation, as well as the outcome of the 
negotiation; perhaps this explicit discussion of the fairness of process 
would act as a ―pass-through‖ and provide some vicarious experience of 
procedural justice for the principal. For Client B, the attorney could 
similarly explain the process of negotiation, but Client B might be more 
puzzled by the relevance of the fairness of treatment, given that Client B 
was not present and had not expressed an interest in fairness. And as for 
Client C, he will be interested in the fairness of the process only to the 
extent that he can gauge to what degree that fairness has contributed to his 
attorney‘s degree of enthusiasm about the outcome, so that he can discount 
the attorney‘s advice about acceptance or rejection by that measure.210  
However, it seems most likely that many clients have never explicitly 
considered the importance, or lack thereof, of the fairness of treatment 
they (or their attorneys) have been afforded in negotiation. For these 
clients, then, the ethical concern is that the client may receive no separate 
and unique benefit from the lawyer being treated fairly. A lawyer 
receiving fair treatment is more enthusiastic about the negotiated outcome, 
but the lawyer received the benefit of the dignitary aspects of procedural 
justice. Again, the client could potentially receive these benefits 
vicariously if the attorney passed along a description of the negotiation 
 
 
 209. The case of the client who cares about fairness ex ante, but not after the negotiation, seems 
less likely and has no support in the literature. 
 210. As noted in Part III.B.2, supra, there has been no clear relationship demonstrated between 
outcome and procedural justice in distributive negotiation, so an effort to ―discount‖ enthusiasm in an 
amount reasonably corresponding to some degree of procedural fairness experienced may be 
impossible. Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 169, at 490. 
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process, but there is not yet research exploring the benefits—or even the 
existence—of reflected, or transitive, procedural justice. If, in fact, an 
attorney‘s opinion about the outcome of the case is affected by the way 
that the attorney was treated personally, this may lead to an ethical 
problem, because the attorney is charged with serving the interests of the 
client. In other settings where the interests of the principal and agent may 
clash, the rules of professional conduct require the lawyer to act in 
accordance with the wishes of the principal, not the agent.
211
  
An obvious but unwieldy solution to this ethical problem would be to 
have clients present during negotiations. In that way, clients could 
experience the fairness of the negotiation process themselves, rather than 
vicariously. Whatever the procedural justice effects might be, the client 
could experience them, or not experience them, herself.
212
 This would pose 
some logistical difficulties; it would also be possible that the presence of 
the client on a regular basis during legal negotiations would eliminate 
some portion of the benefit that comes to parties from outsourcing the 
negotiation of their disputes. For instance, the animosity between the 
parties that is tempered by a negotiation between two lawyers would not 
be dampened if clients attended a negotiation. Emotional concerns that 
lawyers might mitigate without clients present might be at the fore in 
negotiations with clients in the room. And, indeed, some might argue that 
procedural justice research merely highlights yet another area in which 
lawyers reasonably add value by ensuring that their clients are not 
hampered by their fairness needs in negotiation; if attorneys could act 
purely economically, leaving aside the fairness concerns that principals 
would bring to the table, attorneys could ensure that parties achieved the 
best purely economic outcomes possible without concern about procedural 
fairness ―noise‖ in the negotiation. This would be yet another way that 
attorneys, acting as agents, would best serve their principals, who are 
hampered by emotional and nonrational perspectives on their disputes with 
others. However, this argument presumes that what individuals really 
value is, indeed, the bottom-line economic outcome alone. And that 
presumption is at the heart of the question about the value of procedural 
justice in dispute resolution systems. 
 
 
 211. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007) (vesting authority to decide 
whether to settle a case exclusively in the client). 
 212. Indeed, Welsh has suggested that disputants‘ lack of presence during negotiation may 
contribute to a poor assessment of the procedural justice of negotiation as a dispute resolution 
mechanism more generally. Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants’ Decision Control in Court-Connected 
Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 186 n.36.  
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To the extent that greater procedural justice does not predict better or 
worse outcomes in negotiation, it seems worth understanding, as an 
attorney or litigant, that parties may care about factors beyond economic 
outcome. Perhaps some litigants would be willing to expressly trade 
process for outcome, but there is no reason why the process fairness–
outcome relationship need be zero sum.
213
 A loss of fair process does not 
appear to produce a concomitant gain in outcome, and vice versa. Perhaps 
an express acknowledgement of the scope of the relationship between fair 
process and negotiation outcome would lead to better communication 
between lawyers and clients, both before and after negotiation, and would 
allow for a greater explicit role for procedural fairness, which may be an 
important part of what disputants really want in dispute resolution.  
CONCLUSION 
Over a decade ago, Herbert Kritzer wrote that a cynic might suggest 
that ―Equal justice under law‖ ought to be replaced with the motto, ―Let‘s 
make a deal.‖214 Kritzer asked, ―[I]s there an inconsistency between 
‗justice‘ for an aggrieved party achieved through adjudication and ‗deals‘ 
arrived at by parties in a dispute through negotiation?‖215 While other 
literature has suggested that there are outer fairness boundaries on the 
substance of the deals parties will accept, so that some form of distributive 
justice is at work in negotiation, I have suggested in this article that 
individuals in negotiation are also concerned with the procedural justice of 
the deal-making process. Perhaps, to be accurate, ―Let‘s make a deal‖ 
might actually need to read, ―Let‘s make (using a fair process) a deal (that 
is fair to both parties).‖  
Recent research suggests that in legal negotiation, negotiators are more 
enthusiastic about their negotiated outcomes when they have experienced 
higher levels of procedural justice in the negotiation process. Feeling as 
though they have had an opportunity to be heard and have been treated 
with courtesy and respect appears to lead parties to judgments that they 
have been treated fairly in negotiation. Feeling as though the other party is 
trustworthy and that the process has been neutral may potentially play a 
similar role in forming fairness of process judgments.  
 
 
 213. There is no data to suggest, for example, that, as with Jennifer Robbennolt‘s findings on 
apology, parties will accept a worse settlement in exchange for fair process, or that lawyers will 
demand a better settlement from those who treat them fairly. See Robbennolt, supra note 185, at 378.  
 214. KRITZER, supra note 81, at 3.  
 215. Id. at 4. 
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But the relationship between procedural effects experienced by one 
individual and the perceptions of the negotiated outcome by another 
individual not privy to the negotiation process is an open research 
question: the role of the lawyer complicates the procedural justice 
mechanism in bilateral negotiation significantly. That is not a reason to 
abandon an exploration of the effects of fair treatment in negotiation; 
indeed, it is a reason to continue to conduct empirical research into 
procedural justice effects in a principal-agent setting. Given the robustness 
of findings suggesting a vital role for procedural justice in people‘s 
understanding of the law, the legal system, and that system‘s legitimacy, it 
is particularly important to understand how procedural justice works in 
negotiation when so many of our disputes are settled in the shadow of 
legal process.  
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